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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to explore a major 
implication of Bern's "self-perception" explanation of 
cognitive dissonance phenomena and the ramifications of 
this implication for the "interpersonal simulation" 
technique employed to test self-perception theory. In 
a "forced compliance" paradigm experiment self-perception 
theory maintains that for the 3 perception of his counter- 
attitudinal behaviour and its immediate controlling con­
ditions are the only salient factors eliciting dissonance­
like phenomena. Accordingly, premanipulation attitude 
(the S !s original attitude before engaging in counter- 
attitudinal behaviour) is non-salient to the experimental 
phenomenology. Consequently, Beni concludes that preroan- 
ipulation attitude is irrelevant information for an 
external observer-subject in an "interpersonal simulation" 
of a "forced compliance" paradigm experiment.
The present study employs a partial replication of 
Ben and AcConnell's (1970) original efforts to test the 
salience of premanipulstion attitude position, v/ithin 
a "forced-compliance framework 3 s were requested to 
recall their original attitude position on an issue after 
writing relevant counterattitudinal essays as a test of 
the salience of initial attitude position.
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The S population was divided into two groups: those 
for whom the issue in question was of high importance 
(was highly relevant and Ss expressed strong commitment) 
and those for whom the issue was of low importance. 
Generalizing from cognitive dissonance theory, it was 
predicted that high importance Ss would produce greater ' 
recall error after counterattitudinal behaviour than low 
importance Ss.
A separate component experiment, utilizing a tradit­
ional attitude change measure as the outcome variable, 
was included to insure dissonance phenomena had occured 
and provide phenomenological comparison with the recall 
experiment. Again, Ss were divided on the importance 
variables and predictions were based on cognitive dis­
sonance theory.
The results show that dissonance phenomena did occur 
in both experiments since os writing counterattitudinal 
essays did make greater recall error and attitude change 
than control Ss who did not write relevant .essays. The 
main hypotheses which predict interaction effects between 
the importance of attitude variables with high importance 
experimental Ss producing greater attitude change and 
recall error than low importance experimentals were not 
supported as stated. However, a statistically significant 
interaction effect, reverse to that predicted, did occur 
in the recall experiment. Thus, low importance experimental 
Ss made greater recall error in the direction of positions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
argued in the essays than high importance experimentals 
or controls. In the experiment with change scores as 
the dependent variable, it was found that high importance 
experimental Ss tended to change their attitudes more 
than low importance experimentals as predicted, although 
this difference did not reach statistical significance. 
Moreover, when variance due to differences in initial 
attitude position as a co-variant were included in stat­
istical analysis, the results show statistically significant 
differences in dissonance effect between the two exper­
imental treatment groups (with high importance 3s demon­
strating greater change than low importance Ss) when 
strength of commitment was the measure of importance.
■These results were discussed in terms of their rele­
vance to Bern's theory and his "interpersonal simulation" 
methodology. It was concluded that premanipulation att­
itude is a salient factor in producing dissonance-like 
effects in a "forced compliance" experiment for some ind­
ividuals. hamely, those individuals- for whom the attitude- 
issue of focus in the experiment is of high importance.
Thus, the results tend to be non-supportive of Bern's pos­
ition.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Behaviourism as a school of psychology, defines its 
purpose as: the objective, systematic investigation of 
observable responsive activity in organisms without ref­
erence to consciousness (Watson, 1930). The behavioural 
school within this theoretical and methodological frame­
work, has made exceptional progress towards the tradit­
ional goal of psychology as a science - the prediction 
and control of human behaviour.
The behavioural approach has had notable effects on 
many areas of psychology. Its influence on any g'iven 
aspect of the study of the human organism generates const­
ructive theoretical and research productivity, and approp­
riate controversy. Recently, even cognitive theory has 
tangled with the behavioural influence. For example, 
Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1937 5 
1958> 1962, 1964) has had such an encounter through the 
theory and research generated by D. J. Bern's self-perception 
theory (Bern, 1953, 1967, 1967). Predictibly, Bern's alter­
native explanation of cognitive dissonance phenomena has 
generated a good deal of controversy. This paper is an 
attempt to provide data which is significant for one of
1
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the ma^or controversial aspects of Bern's theory and meth­
odology, specifically his premise that a person has no 
knowledge of his attitudes (or beliefs) until he observes 
himself engaged in behaviours relevant to such attitudes - 
that prernanipulation attitude ratings are not salient to 
post manipulation attitude ratings.
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THEORETICAL REVIEW 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is a 
particularly important example of a family of theories termed 
cognitive consistency or balance theories. The common element 
of these theories is that they postulate the human organism 
strives to maintain a consistency or balance among its cognitive 
elements.
The basic units of dissonance theory are cognitive elements. 
In Festinger's terms cognitive elements are "knowledges" about 
various objects, facts, circumstances, behaviours etc. Beliefs, 
attitudes, and opinions are included in the term "knowledges".
Two cognitive elements may have relevant or irrelevant relation 
to one another. Relevant relations are of two types, dissonant 
and consonant. A consonant relation implies that one element 
follows from another. A dissonant relation (here, the opposite 
of consonant) implies an inconsistency between cognitive 
elements. According to Festinger, (1957)» "two elements are 
in dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the 
obverse of one element would follow from the other". For 
example, one's knowledge that he cowers from a fist fight is 
in dissonant relation to his belief that he is a brave man, 
since brave people are not afraid to defend themselves. The 
contemporaneous existence of two such opposite elements results 
in an uncomfortable drive-like state referred to as dissonance.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Magnitude of Dissonance
The magnitude of dissonance betv/een cognitive elements
is dependent upon both the "importance” of the elements and
the proportion of relevant elements that are dissonant. With
respect to "importance" Festinger (1957) states:
"If two elements are dissonant with one another 
the magnitude of the dissonance will be a function 
of the importance of the elements. The more 
these elements are important to, or valued by, 
the person the greater will be the magnitude of 
dissonance."
Thus, for example, if a person watches a television program 
of which he has previously expressed a dislike, the magnitude 
of dissonance is rather weak since neither of the two elements 
involved is very consequential to the person. On the other 
hand, if a student does not study for a very important exam­
ination knowing that his fund of knowledge is inadequate to 
pass, the magnitude of dissonance is much greater since the 
elements that are dissonant are much more important to the 
person.
The magnitude of dissonance also increases with an incr­
ease in the proportion of cognitive elements in dissonant 
relation. For example, the more reasons known to a smoker to 
stop smoking, the greater the dissonance created by continued 
smoking (Festinger, 1957).
The magnitude of dissonance is greater the less the 
justification as, for example, the amount of positive or neg­
ative inducement used to get a person to engage in dissonant 
behaviour (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959). Thus, a person 
will experience less dissonance if he is paid '^50 to argue
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
against his beliefs than if he is given $.50. Moreover, the 
magnitude of dissonance also increases the more the person 
perceives he had a real choice in commiting the discrepent 
behaviour (Brehm and Cohen, 1962). Thus* if a person is allowed 
to choose whether or not he will co-operate in a behaviour 
discrepent with an attitude he will experience greater dissonance 
when performing the task than if he had been forced to perform 
the task.
Dissonance Reduction
Since the existence of dissonance enduces psychological 
tension or discomfort it will '’motivate" (Festinger, 1958) the 
person to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.
Moreover, the strengths of the pressures to reduce dissonance 
functions directly with respect to the magnitude of dissonance. 
Dissonance reduction can be achieved in any of these ways: 
changing a behavioural cognitive element, changing an 
environmental cognitive element, or adding new cognitive 
elements (Festinger, 195?)* When the smoker stops smoking due 
to increased information about the deleterious effects of 
smoking he is changing a behavioural cognitive element to 
reduce dissonance. The individual who distorts the perceived 
political orientation of candidate in order to justify voting 
for him is changing an environmental cognitive element. Finally, 
the individual adds cognitive elements to reduce dissonance 
when, as an example, the smoker reads material critical of the 
research linking cancer to smoking.
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The Forced-Compliance Paradigm
There are essentially two experimental paradigms designed 
to test dissonance theory, the "free-choice" paradigm and the 
"forced-complianee" paradigm. Since this study is directly 
concerned only with the latter paradigm it alone will be 
discussed here.
The most frequently cited evidence supporting cognitive 
dissonance theory comes from an experimental procedure termed 
the "forced-compliance" paradigm. The paradigm tests the 
theoretical proposition that one of the major ways of reducing 
dissonance is to change beliefs or attitudes so that they are 
no longer inconsistent with behaviour. Within this .paradigm 
Ss are typically requested to engage in a task they would not 
ordinarily perform such as writing an essay with a theme 
contradictory to their initial attitude. The S is usually 
offered either a large or a small reward for participating 
(e.g, Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959) or is given relative 
freedom of choice to comply (e.g. Brehm and Cohen, 1959). As 
noted above, cognitive dissonance theory predicts that the task 
or issue involved is evaluated in a more dissonance - reducing 
direction the smaller the reward or the less "coerced" the S 
is to perform the act (e.g. Aronson and Carlsmith, 19635 Brehm 
and Cohen, 1959s Freedman, 1965). Thus, in the counterattitudinal 
essay task the S can reduce dissonance by changing his original 
attitude to conform more closely to the expressed attitude in 
the essay. Greater attitude change is predicted to occur as 
a function of the amount of inducement and/or freedom of choice
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to comply. Such predictions have frequently been supported 
in terms of group data.
Furthermore, Festinger, (1957) predicts that degree of
dissonance reducing behaviour in the forced compliance paradigm
(e.g. as reflected in attitude change) is a function of the
"importance”, for the S of the issue or attitude of focus in
the experiment. He is quite explicit on this point:
" . . .  the more important the opinions or behaviour 
involved, the greater will be the magnitude of 
dissonance accompanying forced-compliance. . . .
The greater the importance of the opinions involved 
the greater is the magnitude or reward or punish­
ment necessary to elicit forced compliance and the 
greater is the magnitude of the dissonance that is 
created."
These predictions are frequently supported in terras of group 
data (e.g. Brehm, 1956; Cohen', 1962).
Recently, Bern (1964) has offered an alternative explan­
ation of dissonance phenomena within a strict behavioural 
framework. His theory (self-perception theory) utilizes 
concepts derived from Skinner, (1955? 1957). He assumes the 
dissonance results to be valid but offers a radically differ­
ent explanation for these effects.
Self-Perception Theory
Bern’s theory eschews any underlying processes (such as 
cognitive dissonance) and attempts to analyze in stimulus- 
response terms behaviour characterized as beliefs and attit­
udes. The major thesis of his theory is that:
"The functional properties of self-knowledge (e.g. 
beliefs and attitudes) do not differ in any way 
from the knowledge-of-others and that the ontogeny
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of self-knowledge similarly has its roots in social 
interaction." (cf. Mead, 1934; Ryle, 1949; Skinner,
1953).
According to Bern's theory beliefs and attitudes constit­
ute covert and overt statements involving self-knowledge and 
knowledge-of-others about self and other-self knowledge.
The process involved in knowledge of otherb beliefs and att­
itudes has been effectively taught by the community. Any 
inferences the individual makes about another's beliefs or 
attitudes are influenced by or inferred from observed beh­
aviour (verbal or otherwise) and the apparent rationale for 
the behaviour. No other effective means of inference is 
possible. For instance, the anti-war demonstrator is believed 
to harbour a belief system and attitudes that are contrary to 
participation in war because of his observed behaviour (i.e. 
he demonstrates and shouts anti-war slogans). The signific­
ant aspect of Bern's position is that self-perception of one's 
own beliefs and attitudes functions under the same controlling 
conditions as the inference statements made about other's 
beliefs and attitudes. Thus, the anti-war demonstrator labels 
his own attitude as "anti-war" by reference to his overt be­
haviour in the same way an observer of his actions labels his 
attitude "anti-war". Furthermore, this self-perception process 
used to infer private attitudes is a consequence of the social­
izing communities' training in perception and description of 
extra-self events and behaviours.
Thus, although it appears that covert and overt self- 
descriptive statements are exclusively under "private" stimulus 
control "they raay in fact remain under the discriminative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9control of the same public events which members of the community 
must use in 'inferring* the individuals inner states" (Bern,
1965).
According to Bern's theory mere observation of a behaviour 
is not sufficient for the observer to make statements or 
inferences as to the behaviour's implications. In order to 
ipake accurate' judgements about a unit of behaviour and its 
belief-attitude implications, knowledge of the controlling 
conditions of a given behaviour is essential.
Beliefs and Attitudes and Their Operant Qualities
Beliefs and attitudes can be classed as social operants 
because they "operate" on the.environment in a functionally 
equivalent way. Operants exist within a "three term relation: 
discriminative stimulus, operant response, reinforcing stimulus" 
(Bern, 196^). Therefore, the social operant is open to the 
influence of two basic kinds of controlling conditions. Its 
nature and strength is dependent upon the invoking discriminative 
cues and consequent reinforcement contingencies.
There are essentially two types of social operant defined 
in terms of the nature of controlling stimuli; "mands and 
tacts" (Skinner, 195?). A social operant which is primarily 
under the functional control of relevant, specific reinforcing 
stimuli is termed a mand. The response "please close the door" 
is such an operant since only door closing behaviour will serve 
as a reinforcer for it. Mands represent requests for specific 
reinforcement. Thus commands, demands, pleas and some questions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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are mand-type operants. It should be noted that it is the 
functional properties of an operant, rather than its formal 
properties which determines its classification (Bern, 196k) 
as a mand or tact.
Thus, "My it is noisy in the hallway" may be a mand 
specifying door closing behaviour as reinforcement, even though 
the statements formal properties are not mandlike.
A "tact" on the other hand as defined by Bern, (1965, 
following Skinner, 1957) is "a social operant which is under 
discriminative stimulus control and only generalized or non­
specific reinforcement control." Thus, specific discriminative 
stimuli predominate to control the evoking of a tact. This 
operant is relatively independent of its specific reinforcing 
consequence. The deprivation state of the individual for a 
particular reinforcement is not crucially determinant of a 
tact's occurrence. General conversation is often consisted of 
a predominance of verbal tacts which through their naming, 
referring or describing function provide contact with environmental 
stimuli (as the discriminative cues). The response "My it is 
noisy in the hallway" made in the hallway to others in the 
hallway becomes a tact. In this case, the most relevant 
controlling stimuli of the response is the discriminative 
stimulus, noise.
Assessing the verity of behaviour in terms of its belief- 
attitude elements involves an analysis of the controlling 
stimuli of the behaviour. The individual makes "mand-tact 
discriminations" in deciding whether to accept the behavioural
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
communication as representative of true belief. As an exam­
ple, consider the differential implications of the statement, 
"this medicine is good" proclaimed on the one hand, by a child 
joyfully downing a spoonful of medicinal syrup and on the 
other, by a television-ad drug salesman. Which of these 
overtly identical statements is to be accepted as a tact?
For the child, "this medicine is good!" is a verbal-tact oper­
ant since it'is clearly under the predominant control of the 
discriminative stimulus tasty medicine. It may be inferred 
that the salesman is specifying reinforcement (Buy my med­
icine!) with his statement rather than responsing to discrim­
inative stimulus control of the "goodness" of the medicine. 
Consequently, the tacting statement of the child is more 
acceptable as representative of his true belief. The child's 
behaviour would more likely be interpreted by an observer as 
indicative of true belief than the manding statement of the 
salesman.
In accordance with his central thesis such mand-tact 
discriminations based on observable behaviour (public or once 
public) and their controlling conditions are employed in the 
same way for both interpersonal and intrapersonal derivations 
of belief and attitude statements.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
R3S.EARCH R37I3V/
Self-Perception Theory and the "Forced-Compliance" Paradigm
Bern originally employed the "interpersonal replication" 
(also termed "interpersonal simulation") experiment as a means 
of explaining cognitive dissonance results through his theory.
A derivation of the self-perception hypothesis is that out­
side observers to a cognitive dissonance experiment should 
be able to duplicate the participating subject's ratings.
An "interpersonal replication" experiment simply consists of 
providing "observer subjects" (OS) with a description of a 
cognitive dissonance experiment. The "observer subject" is 
requested to make his own estimate of what he feels the 
"participating-subjects 1" (PS) ratings would have beem.
Bern (1964-, 1965, 1967b, 1967c) found he was able to duplicate 
cognitive-dissonance results in the "interpersonal replication" 
experiment. lioreover, the majority of Bern's evidence to 
support his theory has been based on "interpersonal replic­
ations" of cognitive dissonance experiments.
The procedures involved in "forced compliance" tests of 
dissonance theory have already been described. Results of such 
studies have been generally consistent with an interpretation 
based on cognitive dissonance theory. Bor example, Festinger 
and Carlsmith, (1959) in the best known study employing the 
forced compliance paradigm divided 60 Ss into three experi­
mental conditions and requested all Ss but the control group 
to tell a waiting S that the tasks they had just completed were 
very enjoyable. The tasks were in fact quite dull. Ss in one
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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experimental group were paid $20.00 for complying whereas 3's 
in another group received only $1.00. The control S received 
no payment. Consistent with.cognitive dissonance theory S s 
in the $1.00 group engaged in more dissonance reducing behav­
iour (personally evaluated the tasks as more enjoyable) than 
did the S s paid 120.00. The $20.00 S-s did not express attit­
udes significantly different from controls.
As stated, 3em rejects the dissonance "drive" theory and 
explains such "dissonance phenomena" on the basis of his 
behavioural self-perception. He would explain the Festinger- 
Carlsmith, (1959) study by suggesting that if a S were to 
observe the study he, as an observer would judge S s  in the 
$20.00 condition as having participated primarily to receive 
the reinforcement. Thus the $20.00 communicator was "manding" 
reinforcement rather than engaging in behaviour consistent 
with discriminative stimuli for that behaviour. On the other 
hand, the $1.00 communicator would be judged by an observer 
as having actually liked the tasks since he related this 
communication to waiting subjects for so little money. The 
verbal operant behaviour (telling the waiting S s) is judged 
a tact. Therefore, Bern would say that both the participating 
3 s and the observer S s make their eventual judgements based 
upon the same observed behaviour and consequently make equiv­
alent attitude ratings based on the behaviour. The typical 
forced compliance results are not unexpected in Bern's theory. 
The unique expectation of Bern's position is that equivalent 
dissonance phenomena occur in an interpersonal replication of 
a forced-compliance study.
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Bern, (1967b) performed such an interpersonal replication 
of the Festinger Carlsmith, (1959) experiment. Seventy-five 
college undergraduates were divided into three groups? the 
$1.00, $20,00 or control condition.
All Ss listened to a tape recording which described a 
college sophomore who had participated in an experiment 
involving two motor tasks. The tasks were described in detail 
but non-evaluatively. At this point, control Ss were asked 
to evaluate the sophomores attitudes toward the tasks. The 
experimental Ss were given the information that he had accepted 
$1.00 ($20,00) to relate to a waiting S that the tasks were 
enjoyable, Ss then listened to a purported recording of the 
conversation between the sophomore and the waiting S. The 
situation attempted to duplicate the condition actually 
experienced by Festinger and Carlsmith's Ss.
All Ss were then required to rate the tasks as they 
estimated the sophomore would have rated them. Results indicated 
support for Bern's self perception hypothesis since in both 
studies the $1.00 condition produced significantly more 
favourable ratings toward the tasks than did the $20,00 
condition. In neither study was the $20.00 condition significantly 
different from the control condition. Jones, (1966) in a 
replication of this study (the Bern interpersonal replication) 
reports similar results.
Bern, (1965) reports a successful interpersonal replication 
of the Cohen, (Brehm and Cohen, 1962) study in which under­
graduates were offered varying amounts ($50.00, $1,00, $5.00,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15.
$10.00) to write an essay against their initial opinions on 
an issue. Cohen’s results essentially duplicate the Festinger- 
Oarlsmith findings in that the higher the paid inducement the 
less post-essay attitude rating coincided with the view advoc­
ated in the essay. Bern's, (1965) interpersonal replication 
study employed 60 undergraduates placed in $.50, $1.00 and 
control conditions. Again Bern's observer S s when told the 
behaviour of the participant 3 s and apparent controlling cir­
cumstances made almost identical ratings of the participant 
S' s post essay attitude rating.
Many other interpersonal replication tests of dissonance 
phenomena have been reported by Bern, (1964, 19&5> 1966, 196?b, 
196?c) and are supportive of his theory.
The interpersonal replication paradigm while offering the 
most convincing support of the self-perception hypothesis is 
not the only experimental strategy which has been used to test 
Bern. Bern reports several studies (e.g. 1964, 1966) which are 
entirely "intrapersonal" in nature, yet designed to test his 
theory. Moreover, these studies add a further control to the 
stimulus operations which have been interpreted as controlling 
mand-tact discriminations in that the "manding" and "tacting" 
stimuli are "raised from birth" in the laboratory. One such 
study will be described here along with an attempted inter­
personal replication of it (V/oodyard, 1968).
Bern, (1966) in an experiment termed the "false confession" 
study, predicted on the basis of the self-perception hypothesis 
that more errors of recall v;ould occur after a S had made
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
lower "false confessions" under conditions previously assoc­
iated with telling the truth (tacting). He also predicted 
that stimuli previously associated with lying (manding) would 
create self-disbelief in true confessions, thus produces more 
errors in recall. The tact and mand stimuli were lights to 
which the S had been trained to respond truthfully (the tact 
light) or falsely (the mand light). As Bern, (1964) points out 
with reference' to this procedure, "the answering of questions 
has both mand and tact properties; we are using the terms tact 
and mand respectively to indicate discriminative control or 
absence thereof over the form of the response". -
Previous to the "stimulus raising" procedure S s were 
required to participate in a word crossing-out task. Meaning 
(tell the truth or lie) was then given to the lights. The E, 
telling the S s that he was interested in hearing the quality 
of their voices for a lie detection experiment, indicated to 
the S whether he should respond into a microphone correctly 
or incorrectly about his "crossing-out" behaviour. The S was 
told the two lights would continue to flash on in random order 
as an indication of when to speak into the microphone. After 
each response the S indicated what he recalled as his actual 
cross-out behaviour.
In accordance with Bern's prediction, more errors of re­
call were made when "true" statements were uttered in the 
presence of the "lie" light and when "false" statements were 
uttered in the presence of the '"truth" light than in the other 
conditions. Moreover, the S's ratings of confidence in re­
call were lower in the conditions with more recall errors.
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Thus, in Bern's terms previously learned discriminative cue 
value of the lights influenced the confidence (self-credibility) 
S-s had in their own judgement of recall.
Woodyard, (1968) noting that the false confession study 
"was an experiment whose dependent variable was self-descriptive 
statements", concluded an interpersonal simulation of the study 
should produce the same judgements of recall. Woodyard reas­
oned on the basis of the self-perception hypothesis, in an 
"interpersonal simulation" of Bern's experiment, 0-S s should 
be able to make equivalent judgements of credibility on the 
basis of the same mand-tact discriminations available to the 
original participants. Woodyard*s "interpersonal simulation" 
was able to duplicate the "errors in recall" variable except 
that there was no significant' difference in recall errors 
comparing control to true confession lie light condition. It 
completely failed to duplicate the "confidence in recall" var­
iable. With additional analysis Woodyard demonstrated a demand 
characteristics hypothesis (Orne, 1963) was a plausible alter­
native explanation to the results of the false-confession 
studies.
SOME CRITICISM OP B3H1S THEORY AITD RESEARCH
Recently Jones, Linder, Kiesler, Zanna and Brehm, (1968)
have criticized Bern's interpersonal replication experiments
and have proposed an alternative explanation of his results.
"Our alternative explanation of Bern's results 
proposes that an artifact in his descriptions of 
experimental conditions allowed a judgmental 
process quite different from that postulated by 
him. The descriptions used by Ben suggest that 
a typical subject would be quite unwilling to 
compiy with the experimenter's request in the 
first place. However,•the hypothetical subject
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in the description does perform the requested 
behaviour. Observers should therefore infer 
that their subject was atypical and that he was 
initially more willing to comply than most 
subjects. Further, a subject who complied for 
a small incentive would be seen as more atypical 
than a subject who complied for a large incentive.
Our alternative explanation asserts that Bern's 
observer-subjects were not behaving according to 
his hypothesis of self-perception, but rather 
that they merely judged differential hypothetical 
subject self-selection."
Jones et.' al. performed a series of experiments to test 
their hypothesis that Bern's observers were in effect "psychol­
ogizing" about the initial attitudes of participant-subjects. 
They were able to replicate Bern's results using his procedures. 
However, when 0-S s were given information about involved S s 
initial attitudes (their pretest scores), Bern's effect did not 
hold. Observers who were aware of pretest scores predicted a 
positive relationship between incentives and attitude change.
Thus a significant controversy has developed over Bern's 
analysis and supporting simulations which essentially centers 
arotind the information that the 0-S should receive concerning 
the original situation (Bern, 1967a, 1968; Elms, 1967; Jones, 
Linder, Kiesler, Hanna and Brehm, 1968; Mills, 1967). The 
predominant criticism objects specifically to Bern's procedure 
of not telling observer-subjects the original subject's pre­
manipulation attitude.
Bern' s Reply
Bern (Bern and McConnell, 1970) has suggested in reply to 
much of the discussion concerning the salience of premanipul- 
ation attitudes, that much of the criticism has been based upon 
a misunderstanding of his interpersonal simulation (replicat­
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ion) methodology. Using a computer-simulation analogy he 
states that his self-perception theory asserts that an indiv­
idual's attitude statements and the observer's judgements 
about the individual's attitudes are "output statements" from 
the same "internal program". Testing this theory demands an 
accurate assessment of the relevant "input statements" from 
the situation being simulated. Thus through "theoretically 
guided assumptions" certain "input statements" must be elimin­
ated as irrelevant to the model. If both the observer and 
participant subjects are using a self-selection rule in this 
way; "VJhat must my (this person's) attitude be if I am (he 
is) willing to behave in this fashion in this situation" as 
the self-perception theory implies, then Bern, (1970) maintains 
that any conflicting initial attitude must be irrelevant for 
both S's in arriving at their final "outcome stagement" 
(attitude rating). Bern makes a point of stressing that P-S s 
are not forced to participate. Therefore, the P-S concludes 
that his postmanipulation attitude is, in fact, the same att­
itude which motivated compliance in the first place. In the 
theory 0-5 s draw the same conclusion, "That must his real 
attitude have been if he was willing to participate."
A Test of Bern's Contention about the ITon-Seiiance of 
Premanipulation .Attitude
The following study by Bern 5 McConnell(1970) bears direct 
relevance to the study that is the object of this paper
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cu,
and therefore it is described in some depth.
To empirically answer his critics (i.e. Jones, Linder 
et al., 1963) Bern with IlcConnell (1970) designed a study to 
assess the "salience of premanipulation attitude" in the forced 
compliance procedure. Their experimental design involved two 
component experiments. An attitude change experiment and an 
attitude recall experiment. Both experiments utilized the 
forced-compliance paradigm in which subjects wrote counter- 
attitudinal essays under varying conditions of freedom of 
choice to write against their initial positions on a current 
issue. The attitude-change experiment is identical to the 
usual forced-compliance experiment except for the Justification 
manipulation and was included to insure replication of the 
usual dissonance paradigm Bern's model seeks to explain. The 
attitude recall experiment was designed to directly examine 
the "salience" of the initial attitudes for forced-compliance 
S Just after engaging in counterattitudinal behaviour. The 
"salience" of initial attitude is interpreted in terms of the 
Ss error in recall of his initial attitude. Thus, both 
experiments are identical with the exception of outcome measure. 
The outcome measure of the change experiment was attitude change 
whereas the outcome measure of the recall-experiment was 
attitude recall.
Ss in the experiment were 93 male undergraduate engineering 
students. The Ss received course credit points for their 
participation. Separate Ss were employed in the two experiments 
to avoid the confounding effects of obtaining: the two outcome
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measures from the same Ss. All Ss were run in group sessions.
In the first session an attitude questionnaire on various 
campus issues was administered. This questionnaire elicited 
one issue on which 90% of the students held consensual opinions: 
"How much control should students have over the kinds of courses 
offered by the University?" The attitude position responses 
were obtained from a "6l-point horizontal scale labeled at 
10-point intervals from ’No Control’ to ’Complete Control*",
In order to facilitate counterattitudinal essay productions 
in the second session all Ss who fell below the midpoint of 
the scale "Some-Control" were eliminated from further 
consideration.
At the second session, one week later, experimental Ss 
were randomly assigned to the two component experiments and 
consequently to one of two "freedom of choice" conditions were 
instructed in writing that the psychology department was 
continuing its research into campus attitudes and was 
"collecting arguments for and against the various positions 
expressed". The No Choice condition S>s were simply requested 
to write essays against student control of courses. The Choice 
condition Ss were instructed that they could argue either for 
or against the student control of courses issue and that the 
choice was up to them. But, an addendum instruction was given 
to Choice condition Ss in which it was explained that the 
experimenters (Es) already had enough pro-student control 
arguments and now required anti-control arguments. The Es 
then requested of the Choice condition Ss that "as many as
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possible" write anti-control essays.
The treatment conditions were the same in both component 
experiments. However, postmanipulation, the change experiment 
Ss were asked to express their present attitude on the issue. 
Recall experiment Ss were asked to recall their former expressed 
position. After collecting the main measures the experimental 
Ss were asked 'for the other outcome measure. Again the same 
61-point scales were used. All experimental Ss were asked to 
indicate (on a similar scale) how much freedom of choice they 
felt they had in terms of complying to the experimental 
instructions.
Control condition Ss in both experiments were merely 
asked to rate their current or recalled positions. They did 
not engage in any essay writing.
The results of their study are summarized in three tables 
of Appendix E. Table one shows the usual forced-compliance 
results were obtained in the change experiment with Choice 
condition Ss apparently demonstrating greater dissonance 
effects than No Choice or Controls. Table 1 also indicates 
the perception of choice manipulation was successful. Table 2 
presents comparable data for the recall experiment. Here the 
results appear in effect to duplicate the results of the 
change experiment in that £>s in the more dissonant condition 
(Choice condition) make greater recall error than the No Choice 
or Control conditions. Table 3 presents inter-correlation 
data on the measures for the recall experiment. The data 
indicates that high dissonance Ss show a significantly greater
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difference when comparing the correlation of recall versus 
final (the second measure obtained) to recall versus initial 
position.
Bern and McConnell, (1970) interpret these results as 
supportive of their position that premanipulation attitude 
effects are non-salient to the forced-compliance procedure 
since it appears that the higher the apparent dissonance the 
greater is the forgetting effect. Thus, writing counterattitudinal 
essays, under conditions of freedom of choice to comply, 
effectively "wipes out" initial attitude. Moreover, they 
suggest their results indicate that Ss actually perceive their 
postmanipulation attitude to be identical to their premanipulation 
attitude.
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Degree of "Importance" of Attitude Elements 
And Dissonance Phenomena
The theoretical ramifications of the "importance" factor 
(as specified by Festinger, 1957) of an attitude element and 
its effects on dissonance phenomena have already been depicted 
in connection with the discussion of cognitive dissonance 
theory. To reiterate, Festinger proposes that magnitude of 
dissonance and consequent degree of dissonance reducing behav­
iour varies directly as the importance, for the person, of the 
elements in dissonant relation. As Eiesler, (1968) points 
out, what is precisely meant by importance is never really 
made very clear in the theoretical expositions. However, 
importance seems to be (at least) a two-pronged variable.
On the one hand the concept can refer to the relative import­
ance of an attitude element for the individual. Thus, the 
attitude, "I am against the war in Indo-China", may be far 
more important to an involved soldier than to a housewife 
whose only contact with the war is through the newspapers. 
Secondly, importance can refer to the consensual importance 
of the element itself. Thus an attitude to the war in Indo- 
China is, by consensus more important, than an attitude to­
wards a particular brand of razor blades, for example. This 
discussion and the central focus of this study concerns itself 
with the implications of the former (importance for the ind­
ividual) definition.
The experimental literature concerned with manipulations 
of (subjective) importance of attitude elements and the effect
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of varied importance on dissonance phenomena, has been largely- 
confined to investigations based on "free-choice" and "exposure 
to counterattitudinal information" paradigms.
Several studies have experimentally varied level of 
importance within the context of the "free-choice" paradigm.
For example, Brehm, (1956); Cohen, Brehm and Latane, (1959); 
Mills, Aronson and Robinson, (1959); Rosen, (1961); Cohen,
(1962) all produce evidence supportive of the predicted 
differential effects of varied importance of cognitive elements.
"Free choice" paradigm experiments involve a choice 
between attractive or potentially attractive alternatives 
which differ along the dimension of attractiveness (importance 
for the subject). A "free-choice" experiment reported by 
Deutsch, Krauss and Rosenau, (1962) is specifically directed 
toward the manipulation of importance through the manipulation 
of the person's self-involvement. In their experiment female 
Ss rated six different kinds of jam on nine-point bipolar 
rating scales in terms of overall taste and flavor. After the 
Ss had made their ratings, the E selected for each S a pair 
of samples that on the first scale had received equivalent 
ratingst at the centre of the scale. The E then announced 
that, "The company that's sponsoring the research would like 
to give you a sample jar of either brand, whichever you want." 
At this point a female experimenter was introduced as, "an 
expert in the field of food selection factors", who v/as going 
to conduct a panel interview in which she would "probe for 
some of the reasons behind your food preferences". Half of
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the Ss were given a high self-involvement manipulation, half 
were given a low self-involvement manipulation. The high 
self-involvement condition made the choice relevant to valued 
attributes of the self by stressing the relationship between 
people's ability to judge subtle differences in the quality ; 
of foods and their judgemental ability in other areas, such 
as leadership aptitude, executive potential, and artistic 
judgement. The low self-involvement condition was given no 
such self-esteem involving message. Ss were then asked to 
select one or the other jam. After selection the Ss rerated 
all six of the samples. The data show that whether or not the 
choice involves the self (is important to the self), is of 
consequence. In the high self-involvement conditions, the 
chosen alternatives increase in value, and the unchosen 
alternatives decrease in value more than in the low self­
involvement condition,
v
Studies employing the "exposure to counterattitudinal 
information" technique have produced data relevant to differential 
importance of premanipulation attitude effects. The "exposure" 
paradigm utilizes a procedure wherein Ss are merely exposed to 
persuasive counterattitudinal information. Thus, Ss do not, 
themselves, produce counterattitudinal behaviour but merely 
receive it, Cohen, (1962) has labelled, the results of such 
procedures the "boomerang effect" in order to explain them in 
terms of dissonance theory. In the "exposure" situation 
resultant dissonance can be reduced in a number of v/ays. One 
of these ways, and apparently the one most often utilized is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for the S to bolster his original position and thus change 
negatively in terms of the counterattitudinal information.
While this phenomena may he understood in terras of 
dissonance theory, Festinger's theory was not specifically 
designed with "boomerang effects" in mind. In fact, it may 
be argued that Festinger's actual position would countra- 
indicate "boomerang effects" and that such results refute the 
theory.
Recently Sherif, Sherif and Hebergall, (1965) in their 
"social judgement-involvement approach" have dealt extensively 
with the issue of relative "ego-involvement" and its effects 
on attitude change produced by exposure to counterattitudinal 
information. Their formulation is designed to explain the 
"boomerang effect". Here the 'importance" variable of dis­
sonance theory is equated with the "ego-involvement" variable.
Ego-involved attitudes are described by Sherif and 
Cantril, (194-7) as "attitudes that have been learned, largely 
as social values, that the individual identifies with himself; 
and that have affective properties of varying degrees of int­
ensity." This view of ego-involvement has been retained by 
Sherif in his more recent work in the area (Sherif and Hov- 
land, 1961; Sherif, Sherif and Hebergill, 1955).
Various investigators, operationally defining levels of 
"involvement" 'in terras of initial attitude to an issue have 
indicated that degree of initial attitude involvement effects 
postnanipulation attitude change when Ss are exposed to
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counterattitudinal persuasion. She effect has been that high 
involved S s produce less change than low involved 3 s (e.g. 
Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Hovland, Harvey and Sherif, 1957; 
Cohen, 1962a).
On the other hand, Zimbardo (I960) experimentally manip­
ulated involvement by telling 5 s that their attitude-judgement 
about a juvenile delinquency case did or did not provide "a 
good indication of their basic social values, their personal­
ities and their outlook on life problems". He found more 
change occured in the direction of the counterattitudinal 
position under high involvement after exposure to .attitude 
discrepent information. It is interesting to note that Zim­
bardo formulates his hypothesis in terms of dissonance theory. 
Cohen, (1962) producing the opposite results, also analyzes 
his data in terms of their support for the dissonance position.
In summary, the available literature indicates that the 
relative degree of importance of the attitude for the indiv­
idual does effect the nature of attitude change that occurs 
when dissonance is aroused. When S s are exposed to inform­
ation counter to their attitude, the usual finding (e.g. Cohen 
1962) is that S's for whom the attitude-issue is highly imp­
ortant seem to reduce dissonance (hypothetically) bj?- streng­
thening their original attitude position "booming-effect", 
although at least one investigator (Zimbardo, I960) found that 
high importance 3 s weaken their original position after 
exposure.
When individuals are placed in a "free-choice" between 
alternatives situation and their initial attitudes to these
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alternatives are the same, experimentally induced high 
importance of one alternative creates greater dissonance 
(hypothetically) when the choice is made, ihus, high imp­
ortance 3s make greater attitude change with respect to the 
chosen alternative (they evaluate it more favourably) than 
Ss for whom the chosen alternative is not so important 
(e.g. Deutsch, Krauss and Hosenau, 1962). .
To the author's knowledge, no study has examined the 
effect of the importance of the attitude-issue for the S 
within the "forced-compliance" paradigm. That is, no study 
has manipulated degree of subjective importance of an att­
itude and attempted to assess its effects on attitude change 
after "forced-compliance" to counter-attitudinal behaviour 
relevant to the given attitude element.
The present effort is an attempt to examine the possible 
differential effects of the importance variable within the 
context of a "forced-compliance" paradigm.
The Independent Variables of the Present Study
The two independent variables of the present study are
t
designed to reflect the subjective "importance" or "involve­
ment" dimensions of an attitude-issue. The two variables 
"relevance of attitude" and "strength of commitment to attitude" 
are dimensions measured before any experimental manipulation 
had an opportunity to effect the Ss attitude on the issue in 
question (student control of courses at their school). The 
variables were measured through self-report on a Likert-type, 
(1932) scale.
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Operational definitions of these two variables are perhaps
best presented in terns of the scale descriptions for the 5s.
Strength of Attitude Commitment
. . .  we are interested here in how much your position 
means to you. For instance, if you do not feel 
committed at all to your position you will mark the 
scale close to the "ho Commitment ?t all" position 
on the scale. Individuals who are not committed 
to a position are those who could easily be swayed 
to another position. They are relatively open- 
minded about the Issue while still holding an opinion.
■They would not likely participate in any form of 
activity in support of their opinion. At the middle 
range of the Strength of Commitment Scale would be 
less easily swayed from their position. They would 
be willing to support their position in an argument 
or debate perhaps.
At the other end of the scale would be 
individuals who feel strongly or "Completely" 
committed to their position. 3uch individuals would 
see themselves as being very staunch in their position 
and not at all able to be swayed. They would be 
willing to support their position quite actively and 
if given the chance engage in a demonstration on its 
behalf or openly campaign for it.
Attitude Relevance
. . .  Here, we are interested in how often the issue 
comes into your thoughts or conversation or how
often it touches your life —  has implications for 
your daily living. For instance, if this is a 
constant concern you would mark, the scale toward 
the high relevance end of the scale. If you never 
think about It, mark the scale at the low relevance 
end of the scale.
Since one requirement of the "forced-compliance" paradigm 
is that all Ss take a counterattitudinal position, the present 
study assumed that polarity of attitude position is not comp­
letely related to polarity of subjective attitude importance. 
Thus, Ss in the experiment while maintaining consensual position 
on the Issue should be differentiable in terms of the independent
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variables. Research by Ward, (1965, 1966) has indicated the 
viability of such an assumption. Ward, (1965) reports a study 
in which involvement (subjective importance) was varied while 
extremity of position was similar in all S s. The.study shows 
clearly that extremeness of stand and involvement in that 
stand are not perfectly correlated.
Problem
The present study attempts to provide further data in 
resolution:, of a crucial question involving both Bern's self­
perception theory and his methodology employed to test this 
theory, the interpersonal-simulation experiment. The issue 
is, whether or not the S's behaviour in a forced compliance 
experiment (e.g. writing counterattitudinal essays) becomes 
so very salient that it overwhelms his memory about his orig­
inal position. Bern's and his critic's positions on this issue 
have already been discussed. Bern's empirical answer to his 
critics through his study with McConnell, (1970) has also been 
described in some length.
This paper represents a partial replication of the Bern 
and McConnell, (1970) experiments. It employs similar pro­
cedures to assess the salience of premanipulation attitude to 
counterattitudinal behaviour and resultant attitude. In a 
sense, it predicts the same outcome as Bern and McConnell's 
work when results of the present experiment are analyzed with 
undifferentiated group data. This replication should produce 
data which will indicate that counterattitudinal essay writing 
engaged in freely, will induce a dissonance - type
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distortion in attitude recall of initial position which is 
essentially similar to the attitude change phenomenon after 
counterattitudinal behaviour. However, generalizing from 
cognitive dissonance theory assumptions, regarding forced 
compliance, this project predicts differential recall and 
change effects when subjects are partitioned into high and 
low attitude “importance" groups in terms of the attitude to 
be manipulated. Pestinger is quite clear on a point relevant 
here, His theory predicts dissonance increases as “importance" 
for the individual of conflicting attitude elements increases, 
Moreover, amount of dissonance reducing behaviour increases 
concomitantly as “importance" of the attitude increases. Thus, 
differential attitude change effects after the "forced-compliance 
procudure should result when "importance" for the individual 
of the attitude of focus in the essays is varied. Moreover, 
attitude recall of a previously expressed position should be 
distorted differentially in terms of the "importance" variable.
It would be predicted then that high importance Ss would 
exhibit more attitude change and greater recall error than 
low importance Ss,
The study operationally defines "importance" in two ways. 
Since Bern questions the salience of premanipulation attitude 
one indicant of subjective importance which is especially 
pertinent to the issue concerns the functional salience of an 
attitude for the S in everyday life. That is, how predominant 
is the issue-attitude for the individual? How often does he 
think about it, talk about it? How often is it relevant for
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hira? This indicant of importance is termed "attitude rele­
vance" .
The second indicant of importance which is varied in the 
experiment is defined as the "strength of commitment1 the S 
has to the premanipulation attitude. Strength of commitment 
as measured reflects the extent to which the S reports he 
would support his position on an issue.
Briefly then, the problem of the present study focusses 
upon the viability of Bern’s apparent claim that for all ind­
ividuals and groups of individuals, initial attitudes are non­
salient to counterattitudinal behaviour and attitudinal out­
come of that behaviour.
Experimental Eyootheses------------V-- . _ - - —..................... t-‘ i.------------. | . T  — ■ T
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts differential disson­
ance effects when the importance of the attitudinal elements 
in dissonant relation are varied for S s. Various experiments 
particularly within the context of "free-choice" and "exposure 
experimental paradigms has supported this prediction of disson 
ance theory. The following hypotheses are derivations from 
dissonance theory. In this case the predictions are related 
to the "forced-compliance" paradigm. Bern's self-perception 
theory also predicts dissonance-type results after counter­
attitudinal manipulations. However, Bern's theory eschews any 
reference to the characteristics of prernanipulation attitudes 
of the S s in its explanation of dissonance phenomena. 
According to Bern's theory, initial position and differences 
in premanipulation importance of attitude elements is non-
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salient in the production of dissonance phenomenon. Thus, if 
the following hypothesis which predict differential effects 
in terms of initial attitude importance (operationally def­
ined in terms of premanipulation "attitude relevance" and 
"strength of commitment" are supported, they will counter- 
indicate derivations of Bern's theory.
Change Experiment
Hypothesis 1. Experimental subjects writing counterattitudinal 
essays will demonstrate greater attitude change in the dir­
ection of positions argued in the essays than Control Subjects. 
(This prediction is supportive of both Bern and Eestinger's 
positions).
Hypothesis 2. There will be a significant interaction effect 
between attitude relevance level and the treatment conditions 
with experimental high relevance subjects making greater post­
treatment attitude change in the direction of positions argued 
in the essays, than experimental low relevance subjects and 
control subjects.
(If this prediction is supported it will tend to 
counterindicate some implications of self-perception 
theory and be supportive of cognitive dissonance theory).
Hypothesis 3. There will be a significant interaction effect 
between attitude strength of commitment level and the treat­
ment conditions with experimental high strength of commitment 
subjects demonstrating greater postmanipulation attitude 
change in the direction of positions argued in the essays, 
than experimental low strength of commitment subjects and
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controls,
(If this prediction is supported the result will tend 
to counterindicate some implications of self-perception 
theory and be supportive of cognitive dissonance theory).
Attitude Recall Experiment
Cognitive dissonance theory does not make specific pred­
ictions in terms of recall of a previously expressed position 
after counterattitudinal behaviour, however, a derivation 
of the theory would suggest that postmanipulation recall meas­
ure will demonstrate dissonance-type effects. -Ss engaged 
in counterattitudinal behaviour are in a stats of dissonance. 
One way they can reduce this dissonance is to distort their 
original attitude position. ‘The distortion to be effective, 
should take place In the direction of the counterattitudinal 
behaviour. Again, dissonance theory predicts results for the 
recall measure after manipulation which are similar to the 
change measure when importance of attitude is varied. Thus, 
recall error will vary as level of importance varies. How­
ever, similar to self-perception * s position on attitude change 
after treatment, hem’s theory predicts no differential effects 
for the recall measure when differences in initial importance 
of attitude are varied.
Hypothesis d. Experimental subjects writing counterattitudinal 
essays will demonstrate greater recall of initial attitude 
error in the direction of positions argued in the essays, than 
control subjects.
(This prediction is supportive of both bom's and 
Eestinger1s positions).
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Hypothesis 3» There will he a significant interaction effect 
between attitude relevance level and the treatment conditions 
with recall error as the dependent variable. Experimental 
high relevance subjects will make greater recall error in the 
direction of positions argued in the essays than experimental 
low relevance subjects.
(If this prediction is supported, results will tend 
to countraindicate some implications of self-perception 
theory and be supportive of dissonance theory).
Hypothesis 6 . There will be a significant interaction effect 
between attitude strength of commitment level and the treat­
ment conditions with recall error as the dependent variable. 
Experimental high strength of commitment subjects will make 
greater recall error in the direction of positions argued in 
the essays than experimental low relevance subjects.
(If this prediction is supported, the result will 
tend to counterindicate some implications of self­
perception theory and be supportive of cognitive 
dissonance theory).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Subjects
The subjects (Ss) were drawn from the twelfth grade of an 
urban Roman Catholic all-male high school. The original 
subject pool of 179 males produced a sample of 136 who were 
engaged in the actual experiments. This number was further 
reduced to 108 for final analysis due to a non-compliance 
problem (to be discussed later in this chapter). Except for 
consideration in terms of the independent variable, degree of 
attitude relevance (2 levels - high and low) Ss were apportioned 
equally and randomly to the two component experiments and their 
respective experimental conditions.
Experimental Conditions 
For the sake of clarity further description of hhils study 
will be broken down in terms of the two component experiments, 
the Attitude Change Experiment and Attitude Recall Experiment,
Attitude Change Experiment
The main dependent variable here was attitude change from 
premanipulation measurement to postmanipulation measurement 
(one week interval). The independent variables were degree 
of "attitude relevance" and degree of "strength of commitment" 
to attitude. The Ss were separated into two levels of the
37
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independent measure in each case. Before experimental man­
ipulation the S s were separated on the "relevance" dimension 
and assigned randomly to experimental and control conditions. 
For data analysis, 3 s were reseparated on the other independ­
ent variable strength of commitment. The following two mat­
rices show the four experimental conditions and the number S s 
per condition. Matrix (a) shows the experimental conditions 
with 3 s  separated on the relevance dimension. Matrix (b) 
depicts the experimental conditions and their respective cell 
frequencies when 3 s were separated postmanipulation on the 
strength of commitment variable.
Change Experiment - Original Subject Pool 
per Experimental'Condition
(a) High Relevance Low Relevance
Experimental 18 16
Control 18 16
(b)
Experimental
Control
High Strength 
of Commitment
10
13
Low Strength 
of Commitment
10 ■
19
It should be remembered that the lower total subject 
pool represented in matrix (b) is due to the abovementioned 
non-compliance problem during experimental manipulation.
The treatment conditions, designated experimental and 
control for the Change Experiment were designed to replicable 
the forced compliance paradigm of cognitive dissonance phen­
omena. Experimental S s wrote counterattitudinal essays
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(expressing a position counterposed to the attitude issue in 
question for the experiment). They were given "freedom of 
choice" as to the type of essay they wished to write, consist­
ent with and replicating the "choice condition" of Bern and 
McConnell’s (1970) study.1 Controls are treated in the same 
way as experimentals with the exception that they write 
counterattitudinal essays on an issue other than the issue of 
focus for the -study.
Attitude hecall Ihcperiraent
In this case the main dependent variable was recall of 
premanipulation attitude level (measured one week previous to 
treatment, and the recall measure). The data were analyzed 
in terms of attitude recall error. . Again, the independent 
variables were degree of "attitude relevance" and attitude 
"strength of commitment". The 5 s were separated and op-port­
ioned in the same way as in the change experiment with rele­
vance level the initial cell assignment criterion. Strength 
of commitment level separation was performed postmanipulation. 
The S s who scored above the mean (36.3) on the strength of 
commitment scale were assigned to the high group. Those 
scoring at or below the mean were assigned to the low group.
The following matrices are similar to the previous figures 
regarding the attitude change experiment.
1. Due to subject availability limitations, only the essential 
conditions of the Bern and McConnell study were replicated 
here. Thus, Bern and McConnell's bo Choice experimental 
condition was not included in the two component experiments.
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Recall Experiment - Original Subject Pool 
per Experimental Condition
(a)
Experimental
Control
High Relevance 
18
18
now Relevance
16
16
GO High Strength 
of Commitment
Low Strength 
of Commitment
Experimental
Control 17
13 11
11
Treatment conditions of the Recall Experiment are the 
same as those of the Change Experiment. Thus, experimental 
S s write counterattitudinal essays relevant to the issue of 
focus in the study. Controls write "irrelevant" counter­
attitudinal essays.
All of the scales employed to measure the three attitude 
dimensions and perception of "freedom of choice" in experi­
mental treatment conditions were similar to those used by Bern 
and McConnell, (1970) in their study. These were 61-point 
horizontal scales labeled at 10-point intervals (see Appendix 
A for all scales).
Materials
Procedure
In the first session class-size groups of approximately 
30 students participated in via at was termed "a survey of student
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attitudes”. The questionnaire consisted of 10 issues selected 
for their assumed pertinence to the particular population.
The purpose of the study was explained to the subjects through 
the following instructions:
This survey is designed to determine student 
attitudes at your high school on certain important 
current issues. Although your participation in this 
undertaking is entirely at your discretion, we 
would greatly appreciate your co-operation in the 
interests of much needed knowledge and understanding 
of opinions within your student body. All information 
will of course, be kept strictly confidential.
We only ask that you give us the following informations 
date of birth, class and intended career plans.
This data will be collected to facilitate pertinent 
correlations with the attitude information.
Spaces were provided for the identification data. It
should be noted that before collection of the scored
questionnaires, the experimenter emphasized that subject
complete the identification data since he was to return in one
week and required some means without gathering names, of
identifying the students for the next session. Moreover, each
subject was assigned a specific numbered card which the
experimenter requested he bring to the next session for
identification purposes.
The main instructions for the survey follow. Note that
each scale is described carefully so that subjects had an
understanding of the dimensions on which they were to rate the, 
issues.
INSTRUCTIONS
You will notice that each attitude-issue is typed at the 
top of the page and followed by three scales? Attitude Position 
Scale, Strength of Attitude Commitment Scale, and Attitude 
Relevance Scale. The scales are similar In their structure 
and you are simply required to mark each scale by drawing a
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line through the point on the scale that is most appropriate 
for you.
EXAMPLEs
How hungry are you?
1 1... 1 1 1./...... .1 1
Not at Very Somewhat Moderately Quite Very Extremely
all slightly
Someone who feels just a little more than "Quite hungry" would 
mark the example scale as shown.
DESCRIPTION OF SCALES .
ATTITUDE POSITION SCALE
This scale requires that you report your position on the 
issue at the top of the page. Mark the scale at the point 
which most accurately indicates your opinion on the issue,
STRENGTH OF ATTITUDE COMMITMENT SCALE
The second scale requires you to indicate your perception 
of how strong your attitude is on the issue. We are interested 
here in how much your position on the issue means to you.
For instance, if you do not feel committed at all to your 
position you will mark the scale close to the "No Commitment 
at All" position on the scale. Individuals who are not committed 
to a position are those who could be easily swayed to another 
position. They are relatively openminded about the issue while 
still holding an opinion. They would not likely participate 
in any form of activity in support of their opinion.
At the middle range of the Strength of Attitude Commitment 
Scale would be individuals who would be less easily swayed 
from their position. They would be willing to support their 
position in an argument or debate perhaps.
At the other end of the scale would be individuals who 
feel strongly or "completely" committed to their position.
Such individuals would see themselves as being very staunch 
in their position and not at all able to be swayed, They 
would be willing to support their position quite actively and 
if given the chance engage in a demonstration on its behalf 
or openly campaign for it,
ATTITUDE RELEVANCE SCALE
The third scale requires that you indicate how relevant 
the particular issue is for you. Here, we are interested in
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how often the issue comes into your thoughts or conversation 
or how often it touches your life - has implications for your 
daily living. Bor instance, if this is a constant concern 
you would mark the scale toward the high relevance end of the 
scale. If you never think about it, mark the scale at the 
low relevance end of the scale.
After the attitude survey was completed the experimenter 
analyzed the attitude ratings of each issue. The issue on 
which there was most consensus of student attitude position 
and greatest variation in terms of the independent variables 
was selected for further use in the study: "How much control
should students have over the kinds of courses offered at 
their school?" Ninety percent of the students at the first 
session held positions above the midpoint of the attitude 
position scale, "Some Control". The forced-compliance paradigm 
requires that all S s argue counterattitudinally in their 
essays. Therefore, the 10 percent (IS) who held positions 
below the midpoint of the position scale were eliminated 
from the experiment.
A further advantage of the use of the student control of 
courses issue in the experimental manipulation was that Beni 
and McConnell's (1970) work employed the same issue with their 
undergraduate university student subjects.
The resultant K of 161 was now partitioned into two 
levels of attitude relevance based upon scores of the rele­
vance scales. The initial division of 3 s was performed in 
terns of the relevance dimension rather than the strength of 
commitment independent variable since the former variable was 
more normally distributed in terms of the population and was
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thus more readily divisible into high and low subgroups. The 
experimenter arbitrarily determined the limits of the high and 
low relevance groups. Subjects scoring ,:5 and below were 
assigned to the low relevance group. 3 s scoring 35 and 
above were established as the high relevance group. Thus,
25 S s who fell about the midpoint on the relevance scale 
were dropped from further consideration. 3 s divided into two 
levels of attitude relevance were randomly assigned to one of 
four treatment conditions in the component experiments. Res­
ultant cell frequencies are depicted in the matricies of the 
previous section.
At the second session, one week later, S s were again 
run in class-size groups of approximately 30 students. As 
they entered the testing room (a convenient classroom) each 
student was asked to present his numbered identification card. 
he received in the first session. If he was one of the sub­
jects selected to participate in the second session, he was 
given a large (13" X 10") brown numerically identified manilla 
envelope with the appropriate materials for his treatment cond­
ition inside. All treatment 8 s were requested to leave the 
envelope sealed, seat themselves, and await further instruct­
ions. Students who were not selected for further participat­
ion accompanied their teacher to the gymnasium. This "role- 
call" procedure consumed approximately four minutes of the 
one hour alloted per group of students, then the 3 s had all 
been comfortably seated the 3 instructed them to open their 
envelopes saying:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
Before you open your envelopes I would like to 
give you some idea of their contents and some 
instructions as to what you are to do with what 
you find inside. Inside are three smaller (9" 12") 
envelopes of different colours, one white, one 
brown arid one light-green. When I tell you open 
the large envelope and find the light-green one 
inside. Open this light green one and read 
carefully the instructions found inside. Then 
proceed to do as the instructions tell you.
Open only the light green envelope until you 
receive further instructions from me. Are there 
any questions? You have one half-hour to complete 
this part of the experiment, You may now open 
your envelopes.
The two treatment conditions found slightly different
instructions in their light-green envelopes, Experimental Ss
found the following instructions:
The psychology department of the University of 
Windsor is continuing its research into campus 
issues and student opinions. It has been shown 
that one of the best ways to get pertinent arguments 
on both sides of an issue is to ask people to 
write essays favouring only one side. This week 
we are collecting such arguments for and against 
the various positions expressed. Each participant 
is being asked to write a short one page essay 
on one of the issues and to take a specific position 
in its regard. In your case you may write an essay 
arguing that students should have complete control 
over the kinds of courses offered at their school 
or an essay which argues that they should have 
little or no control, the choice is up to you.
Please write your essay on the attached sheet,
Consistent with Bern and McConnell's "choice condition" 
an addendum sheet was inserted between the foregoing instructions 
and the blank essay sheet. This addendum instruction was 
added with the purpose of insuring counterattitudinal 
productions. It read:
Please Note
We now find that we have enough "pro-control" 
arguments and are in need of "anti-control" arguments.
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Therefore, in this session we would appreciate it 
if as many of you as possible would write one 
page essays which argue for the point of view 
that "students should have VERY LITTLE or NO CONTROL 
over the kinds of courses offered by their school.
Thank you.
Control treatment Ss were given exactly the same instructions
in the same way except that the issue of focus was changed to
a lowering of the drinking age issue. Thus instructions varied
only in terms of the underlined sections of the above instructions
for the experimental treatment. These sections were changed
for control treatment subjects to reads
,,, that the drinking age should be lowered to age 
18 or that the drinking age should not be lowered 
to age 18 but kept at the present 21.
addendum sheet-
,., that the drinking age should not be lowered to 
age 18 but kept at the present 21,
All subjects completed their essays within $0 minutes.
When all had finished writing, the E requested that they place
their completed essays back in the large envelope. Next, the
Ss were instructed to open the white envelopes and comply with
the instructions in it. White envelopes contained instructions
which varied according to the component experiment to which
the subject had been assigned. Attitude Change Experiment
subjects received the following instructions;
Please mark the following scale according to what 
best represents your present feeling toward the 
issue of; How much control should students have 
over the kinds of courses offered at their school?
Attitude Recall Experiment subjects received these instructions
in their white envelopes;
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In the first session one week ago, we asked 
your co-operation in a survey of student attit­
udes. One of the issues in the questionnaire 
concerned: How much control students should
have over the kinds of courses offered at their 
school:'
Nov/, we want you to try and recall your feelings 
expressed toward the student control issue in the 
first session by marking the following scale in 
the same place you did one week ago.
The scales used were the same as the attitude position scales 
of one week earlier, with slight modifications for the Recall 
Experiment. These scales are presented in Appendix A.
When the S s  had completed scoring the scales they were 
instructed to place these sheets back in the white envelope 
and place this envelope back in the large manilla envelope. 
Next, 8 s were instructed to open the brown envelopes and 
comply with the instructions in it. Again the typed instruct­
ions differed according to the component experiment each 8 had 
been assigned. Change Experiment 3 s received the same inst­
ructions Recall Experiment S s had received in the white env­
elope. Thus, Change Experiment S s were now requested to 
recall their initial attitude position. On the other hand, 
Recall Experiment S s were asked to rate their present attit­
ude position.
In addition, all experimental condition S s received a 
sheet with instructions and a scale designed to assess their 
perception of how much freedom they had in choosing which'side 
of the student-control issue to favour in the essay. The inst­
ructions for the "freedom of choice scale" (see Appendix A) 
read:
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You have just written an essay taking a strong 
position on the student control of courses issue.
Please indicate on the following scale how much 
freedom of choice you feel that you had in 
choosing which side of the issue to argue for in 
your essay.
Experimental S s were also asked to indicate v/hether they 
had perceived any change in their attitudinal position.
Finally, all S s were requested to return the remaining 
materials to' the large envelope and all envelopes were col­
lected.
In order to control for any qualitative differences of 
the essays experimental S's wrote a "quality control" pro­
cedure involving independent judges was included, fhe judges 
were four undergraduate university students and each was asked 
to rate 11 essays (randomly assigned) in terras of their quality 
of argument and strength of persuasion. A five-point rating 
scale ("poor" to "excellent") was used, fhe results indicate 
no significant differences between high and low importance 
groups. All groups averaged three or "good" on the scale.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 111.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
She first result of consequence to the study concerns 
the outcome of the freedom of choice manipulation in the 
expei*imental treatment conditions. The expected outcome 
based, on Bern and iMcConnell' s (1970) results was a "minimal 
non-compliance problem" due to this aspect of the experi­
mental treatment. The latter researchers report only two 
(of 32) 3s were rendered inappropriate to analysis due to 
their choosing to write pro-control rather than anticontrol 
essays on the student control of courses issue. This study, 
employing a replication of Ben and McConnell’s procedure 
found that 22 (of 66) Ss chose to write pro-attitudinal 
essays. This represents 33m of all Ss assigned to exper­
imental treatment conditions. The independent variable, 
relevance of attitude on which Ss were initially separ­
ated did not effect non-compliance frequency. The fol­
lowing matrices indicate original cell frequencies (the 
bracketed figures) and resultant "n" per cell after the 
non-compliance phenomenon.
i-9
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(a) Change■Experiment - Resultant Cell Frequencies due to 
ITon-Cornpliance__________________ _____________________
Experimental
Control
High Relevance 
(18) 10 
(18) 15
Low Relevance
(16) 10 
(16) 15
(b) Recall Experiment - Resultant Cell Frequencies due to 
Non-Compliance__________ ______________________________
Experimental
Control
High Relevance 
(18) 12 
(18) 15
Low Relevance
(16) 12 
(16) 15
Analysis of the perception of choice data from the 
freedom of choice scale for S s who did comply, indicates 
that the choice manipulation did allow experimental S s 
to perceive freedom in terms of the kind of essay they 
wished to write. In the change experiment mean perceived 
freedom of choice for experimental S s was 59.'+• In the 
recall experiment the respective mean was 38.8. These mean 
scores are well above the midpoint of the scale, "some 
freedom of choice" and are actually higher than Bern and 
McConnell's result (See tables 1 and 2 of Appendix B). The 
scores ranged from the minimum point, 1 to the maximum point, 
60 on the scale. This range was greater than that of Bern 
and McConnell's 3 s. They report all S's ranged between 20 
and 30 on the freedom of choice scale.
Table 1 presents the intercorrelation analysis among 
the three attitude dimensions. These results indicate the 
dimensions as measured are positively related to one another 
and do not represent completely separate factors of the 
attitude element.
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Table 1. Intercorrelation Among Attitude Dimensions;
Attitude Relevance, Attitude Strength of 
Commitment, and Initial Attitude Position by 
Component Experiment
Experiment Initial Position Initial position Strength
X X T r-A
Relevance Strength Relevance
Change + .24* +.61** + .66* *
Recall +.56** +.62** + .29*
p. <.05
** p. <.01
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Product-moment correlations for the initial attitude 
position dimension and the two dependent variables, attit­
ude change and recall error (presented in table 2) suggest 
the possible confounding effects of a covariant, initial 
attitude position in the change experiment where attitude 
change score is the dependent variable. The table shows a 
product-moment r of -.18 when correlating initial attitude 
position and recall error score, This figure is far from 
statistical significance. The correlation of -.38 between 
attitude change score and initial position is statistically 
significant at the .01 level, t-tests between mean initial 
position scores of the four conditions in each component 
experiment indicates statistically significant differences 
between the independent variable levels. Differences in 
initial attitude position between experimentals versus 
controls were very slight and nonsignificant.
'The overall data comparing the treatment groups in 
terms of initial attitude position suggests an analysis of . 
covariance may be appropriate, at least as far as the 
Attitude Change Experiment is concerned.
Bern and McConnell (1970) test their assumption that
the recall measure of their recall experiment is "phenomen-
ologically identical" to the change measure of their change
experiment, in two ways, hirst they invite the reader to
compare the figures of the two experiments (see tables 1
and 2 of Appendix B ) and suggest that "the attitude-recall
figures closely parallel the attitude-change results them-
1. See Appendix I) for further discussion of this correl­
ational result.
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Table 2. Product-moment Correlations between Initial 
Position and the Dependent Variables, Recall 
Error and Attitude Change
Recall Error Attitude Change
Initial Position -.18 (n.s.) ' -.38*
*p. <.01
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selves and display the same kinds of differences among the 
three conditions. The figures are so similar to those in 
the change experiment, that it would appear that we had 
asked these S's (the recall subjects) for their current 
attitudes rather than their initial attitudes."
Next, Bern and McConnell report "another way" of 
testing their prediction of phenomenological identity 
between the two outcorae measure. In this second analysis 
they report an intercorrelation comparison for the data 
of the recall experiment. The S s in their recall experi­
ment were also asked to report their final attitudes after 
they had attempted to recall their initial attitudes. The 
analysis consisted of comparing the correlation for re­
call versus initial attitude, by the correlation for recall 
vei'sus final attitude, in their three treatment conditions 
(see table 3 of Appendix B fox* the reproduction of this 
data). Bern and McConnell suggest that this data supports 
their predictions, since experimental S s, those engaged 
in counterattitudinal behaviour, demonstrate a correlation 
between their recall of their initial attitudes and their 
final attitudes which is significantly higher than the 
correlation between their recall and their actual initial 
attitudes. Moreover, they suggest that the very high 
correlations between recall of initial attitudes and final 
attitudes for the experimental S s (as compared to cont- 
rols) is supportive of their hypothesis that the data 
from the incoming counterattitudinal behaviour, "update the
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attitudinal information for the S and destroy any earlier 
information to the contrary."
The validity of Bern and McConnell's conclusions reg­
arding the foregoing analysis hinges on two factors. In 
the first place, a statistical comparison between two 
correlations for correlated (not independent) samples 
presents certain unavoidable difficulties arising from 
underlying assumptions of the product-moment correlation 
procedure. Hays (1966) in fact, states that such a stat­
istical procedure is rather meaningless. An excerpt from 
Hays (1966) in this regard is presented in Appendix B. 
Ferguson (1966) outlines the statistical computations 
necessary to obtain a comparison between correlations for 
correlated samples, but qualifies his presentation by 
stating that conclusions drawn from this procedure must be 
interpreted with caution.
Moreover, the usefulness of the second outcome measure 
of final attitude for the recall experiment 3 s may be 
questioned. Is this second measure simply an artifactual 
outcome due to experimental demand for consistency between 
the two measures, recall and final a t t i t u d e 3 e m  and 
McConnell propose that the data from their control group 
wherein the correlation between recall and final attitude 
is relatively low, "weakens" the possibility of an exper­
imental demand effect.
In order to present comparative data the present
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study analyzed the data of the two component experiments 
employing Ferguson (1966) procedure for comparing correl­
ations between correlated samples. Because of the 
tenuous validity of this analytical procedure, and the 
questionable nature of the second outcome measure, exper­
imental hypotheses related to this analysis were not incl­
uded.
The resultant data are presented in tables 3 and 4.
The tables indicate that regardless of whether 3 s are 
separated on the independent variables, "strength of com­
mitment" (table 3) or "attitude relevance" (table 4) 
statistically significant differences are found between 
the two correlation coeffecients for both experimental 
treatment condition and control condition. Moreover, the 
correlation coefficients for recall versus final position 
are very high for all conditions. In fact they appeal* 
slightly higher for control condition S s. Apparently, 
the assumption of the artifactual nature of the second 
outcome measure, due to experimental- demand for consistency 
between the two outcome measures is a viable possibility 
in this study.
In this case, the conclusion must be that recall of 
initial attitude and final attitude are "identical" but 
this identity is likely due largely to the demand for con­
sistency effect.
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Table 3. Recall experiment: Product-moment Correlations
between Hecall of Initial Attitude Position and 
Initial and Pinal Attitude Position with Strength 
of Commitment
Condition
Recall
vs.
Initial
Position
Recall
vs.
Pinal
Position
t
Difference
Experimental High 
Strength of Comm. (n=d.2) + .20 + .85 3.4-8**
Experimental Low 
Strength of Comm. (n=12) + .71 + .97 7.63**
Control High 
Strength of Comm. (n=15) +. 64 + .98 8.4-4-**
Control Low 
Strength of Comm. (n=15) + . 64- + .92 2.64-*
* p. <.05
** p. <.01
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Table 4. Recall Experiment: Product-moment Correlations
between Recall of Initial Attitude Position and 
Initial and Pinal Position with Attitude Rele­
vance the Independent Variable
Condition
Recall Recall
vs. vs.
Initial Pinal t
Position Position Difference
Experimental High 
Relevance
Experimental Low 
Relevance
Control High 
Relevance
Control Low 
Relevance
+ .37 
+ .65 
+ .49 
+ .72
+ .85 
+ .89 
+ .97 
+ .96
3.01**
2.26*
6.64****
4.22***
* p. <.10
** p. <.05
*** p. <.01
**** D. <.001
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Major Analyses
A 2 X 2 analysis of covariance (initial attitude 
position as the covariant), with cell frequencies adjusted 
to obtain equal n s, was performed on the data for both comp­
onent experiments. Equal cell frequencies were obtained 
by randomly dropping S s from cells in which the number 
of cases exceeded the smallest n of the experiment. In 
order to minimize the possibilities of Type II error the 
results of simple 2 2 2 analysis of variance are presented, 
when they are pertinent. This will minimize inappropriate 
rejections of an experimental hypothesis due to the effects 
of the covariant. In this regard, it must be remembered 
that the central purpose of the present study was to assess 
the effects on dissonance-type phenomena . (recall of attitude 
and change of attitude after counterattitudinal behaviour) 
when certain properties of the attitude are varied. Thus, 
statistically significant difference between treatments 
due to the combined effects of the covariant, initial att­
itude position, and an independent variable manipulation 
may be a viable result in terms of the studies' central 
problem.
Again the data will be presented in terms of the comp­
onent experiments.
Attitude Change Experiment
Two 2 1 2  (two treatment conditions: experimental and 
control; and two levels of the independent variable attitude 
relevance (high vs. low) or attitude strength of commitment
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high vs low) ) analysis of covariance were performed on 
attitude change scores. Change scores were calculated by 
subtracting each Ss initial attitude from his final attit­
ude. Thus, negative quantities indicate that the Ss 
became less favorable toward student control of curriculum, 
the position argued by compliant Ss in the essays.
Relevance of Attitude
Mean attitude change scores (both before and after 
adjustment with the covariant, initial position of attit­
ude) with level of attitude relevance varied in experi­
mental and control treatment conditions are presented in 
table 5. A summary of the analysis of covariance is pres­
ented in table 6. (A summary of comparable analysis of 
variance is presented in Appendix D.)
'J?he analysis of covariance shows the only significant 
source of variance is an overall significant main effect 
(p. <.001) with respect to experimental treatment (Exper­
imental versus Control Conditions), ihe preceding analysis 
of covariance provides evidence regarding the viability of 
two of the experimental hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Experimental subjects will show sign­
ificantly greater attitude change in the direction of 
positions argued in the essays than control subjects.
.Hypothesis 2 there will be a significant interaction 
effect between attitude relevance level and the treatment 
conditions with.experimental high relevance Ss mating sign­
ificantly greater attitude change than experimental low 
relevance Ss.
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Table 5. Change Experiment: Mean Adjusted a and Unadjusted
Attitude Change Score in each Condition with
Attitude Relevance the Independent Variable
Low :Relevance High Relevance
Experimental -7.1 (-7.95)a -16.5 (-15.26)8
Control +1.3 (-0.07)a + 1.3 (+2.28)a
a Means are adjusted for the covariate, initial attitude 
position.
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Table 6 . Change Experiment: Summary of Analysis of
Covariance with Attitude Relevance the Independent 
Variable
Source df MS F E
A (Treatment) 1 1250.99 9.58 <.01
B (Relevance) 1 58.96 .45 K.S.
AB (Interaction) 1 233.27 1.79 N.3.
Error 35 • 130.56
aRaw scores are transformed by adding a constant (K--I-33)  
in order to eliminate use of negative integers of change 
scores.
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Hypothesis .1-, is supported. It is evident that S s 
in the experimental condition who wrote counterattitudinal 
essays made significantly greater attitude change in the 
direction of the position argued in the essays, than did 
Control 8 s who did not write counterattitudinal essays on 
the issue in question. Ibis result indicates the experi­
ment successfully produced the attitude shift expected 
through cognitive dissonance theory.
Hypothesis 2 did not receive support. Thus level of 
attitude relevance did not differentiate S s on the depend­
ent variable, attitude change. However table 6 indicates 
the difference tended in the predicted- direction.
Attitude Strength of Commitment
Mean covariance adjusted and unadjusted change scores 
with level of attitude strength of commitment varied in 
experimental and control treatment conditions are present­
ed in table 7. A summary of the analysis of covariance 
and comparable analysis of variance is presented in tables 
8a and 8b. The analysis of covariance indicates one sign­
ificant source of variance. 'There is an overall signific­
ant main effect (p. <.001) with respect to experimental 
treatment. The analysis related to two of the experi­
mental hypotheses.
Hypothesis j.» Txperimental subjects will show sign­
ificantly greater attitude change in the direction of pos­
itions argued in the essays than control subjects. .
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Table 7- Change Experiment: Kean Adjusted and Unadjusted
Attitude Change Score in each Condition with
Strength of Commitment the Independent Variable
Low Strength High Strength
of Comm. of Comm.
Experimental -5.3 (~6.92)a -18.3 (-16.00)’
Control +3.7 (+2.l7)a + 1.00 (+1.85)’
Means are adjusted for the covariate, Initial Attitude 
Position.
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Table 8a. Change Experiment: Summary of Analysis of
Covariance with Strength of Commitment the 
Independent Variable3
Source df MS 3?
A (Treatments) '• 1 1795.23 13.80
B (Strength of Comm.) 1 177.82 1.37
AB (Interaction) 1 186.10 1.4-3
Error 35 130.13
P
<.001
?.T OI  'i •  O  *
I'i • 3 •
ciHaw scores are transformed by adding a constant (k=+33)
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Table 8b. Change Experiment: Summary of Analysis of
Variance with Strength of Commitment the 
Independent Variable.
Source df : 'O iuO F P
A (Treatments) 1 2002.23 14.52 <.001
B (Strength of Comm.) 1 616.23 4.4? <.05
AB (Interaction) 1 265.23 1.92 U.S.
Error 36 ' 137.90
aRaw scores transformed Id*/1 aclaing a constant (i:=+33)
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67.
Hypotheses 3* There will be a significant inter-, 
action effect between strength of commitment level and 
the treatment conditions with high strength of commitment 
subjects demonstrating greater attitude change than low 
strength of commitment subjects.
The results in covariance analysis of strength of 
commitment data are similar to those when attitude rele­
vance is varied confirming hypothesis 1 and provide the 
same evidence of significant dissonance effects. The pred­
icted interaction effects are non-significant, discontinu­
ing’ hypothesis 3. Again the data in terms of interaction 
effect tended in the predicted direction.
Moreover, the analysis of variance design which incl­
udes variance due to the initial position of attitude 
dimension, indicates a significant main effect (p. <.05) 
on the strength of commitment variable. Two F tests 
(v.'iner, 1962) were used to analyze the simple effects. The 
results indicate that experimental high strength of commit­
ment S's differed significantly (I[=6.13; df-1.36; p. <.01) 
in attitude change due to the experimental treatment, non­
significant differences were found when the respective cont­
rol groups were compared. This suggests that although the 
strength of commitment variable itself does not produce dif­
ferences in amount of attitude change due to counterattitudinal 
behaviour, its combined effects with initial attitude pos­
ition, result in significant variance. A look at the treat­
ment means of the respective conditions (table 7) indicates
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what these differences reflect. The high strength of com­
mitment experimental group shifts significantly more 
(x=~16.5) than the low strength experimental group 
(x~-7.1). Apparently, the strength of commitment dimen­
sion as measured by itself is not sensitive enough to effect
I
differences. Hypothesis 3 in its stated form must be rej­
ected. However, acceptance of the null hypothesis with all 
of its ramifications seems inappropriate. Further disc­
ussion of this issue should be reserved for the following 
Chapter.
Attitude Recall experiment
Two 2 x 2  analysis of covariance were performed on 
attitude recall error scores. Recall error scores were 
computed by subtracting subject's initial attitude position 
from his postmanipulation recall of that original position. 
Thus, negative scores indicate error in the direction of 
the position expressed in the essays.
Relevance of Attitude'
Mean covariance adjusted and unadjusted recall error 
scores are depicted in table 9. Table 10 summarizes the 
analysis of covariance.
The analysis of covariance results indicate all three 
variance scores are significant. Thus, a significant main 
A effect (experimental versus control), main B effect (high 
relevance versus low relevance) and AB interaction effect 
are noted.
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Table 9. Hecall Experiment: Mean Adjusted8 and Unadjusted
Attitude Hecall Error in each Condition with
Attitude Helevance the Independent Variable.
Low Relevance High Relevance
Experimental -8.33 (-9.4-0)a -0.6? (+0.32)a
Control +1.0 (-0.13)a -0.58 (+0.62)a
aMeans are adjusted for the covariate, Initial Attitude 
Position
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Table 10. Recall Experiment: Summary of Analysis of
Covariance With Attitude Relevance the Indep­
endent Variable.
Source df KS F: •p
A (Treatments) 1 274.44 ■5.19 <.05
B (Relevance) 1 270.55 5.12 <•05
AB (Interaction) 1" 241.81 4.58 <.05
Error 43 52.84
aRaw Scores are transformed by adding a constant (IL= +22)
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Six P tests were computed to test simple effects 
among the adjusted cell means. The results indicate that 
low relevance of attitude 3 s who write counterattitudinal 
essays make significantly more recall of attitude error 
than high, relevance S s who write similar essays (P =10.63 
df = 1.4-3; p<.01). High relevance control S s did not 
make significantly greater recall error than low relevance 
controls. Thus, the difference between means of the exper 
imental conditions accounts for the significant main B 
effect of analysis of covariance. Comparison between 
adjusted treatment means within the low relevance group 
indicated statistically significant differences between 
experimental and control low relevance S s (P = 9.68; df ■ = 
1.4-3; p<^.01). Comparison between adjusted means of the 
low relevance experimentals and high relevance controls 
was also significant (P = 11.29; df = 1.4-3; p<.01). 
Nonsignificant differences were found between experimental 
high relevance and control high relevance and control low 
relevance S s.
The foregoing analyses effect the tenability of two 
of the experimental hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4-. Experimental subjects v/ill show sign­
ificantly greater recall of initial attitude error in the 
direction of the position argued in the essays than cont­
rol subjects.
Hypothesis .p. There will be a significant inter-
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action effect between attitude relevance level and the 
treatment conditions with recall error as the dependent 
variable.. Experimental high relevance subjects will make 
significantly greater recall error in the direction of the 
position argued in the essays than experimental low rele­
vance subjects.
Hypothesis 4 received support at the .01 level of 
significance. Hypothesis 5 w&s n°t supported as stated. 
However, results do indicate a significant interaction 
(p. <.01) effect between the treatment conditions and 
levels of attitude relevance. The nature of this inter­
action Twas in a direction exactly opposite to the stated 
prediction. Thus experimental low relevance _S s make 
significantly greater recall error after manipulation 
than high relevance S s. Moreover, concerning hypothesis 
5, the data indicate that high relevance experimentals do 
not differ in amount of recall error from either control 
group. Therefore, the differences relevant to hypothesis 
4a 'which predicted a main A effect are due largely to the 
diffei’ences between the low relevance experimental 3 s 
and control 3s.
Attitude Strength of Commitment
Adjusted and nonadjusted mean scores for the recall 
experiment with strength of attitude commitment are pres­
ented in table 11. The analysis of covariance is summar­
ized in table 12.
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(Table 11. Recall Experiment: Kean Adjusted and Unadjusted
Attitude Recall Error in each Condition with
Strength of Commitment the Independent Variable.
Low Strength . High Strength
of Commitment of Commitment
Experimental -7.45 (-7.?6)a -1.09 (-0.76)a
Control +5.9 (+5.46)a +0.09 (+0.52)a
aKeans are adjusted for the covariate, Initial Attitude 
Position.
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fable 12. Hecall Experiment: Summary of Analysis of
Covariance with Strength of Commitment the 
Independent Variable .
Source df MS p
A (Treatments) 1 4-29.04- 8.99 .01
B (C ommit m ent) 1 23.66 .50 !'•« • S *
AB (Interaction) 1. 268.38 5.63 .05
Error 39 4-7.68
aRaw scores transformed by adding a constant (K-+22).
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The covariance analysis indicates statistically sign­
ificant main A effect (experimental vs. control) and an 
AB interaction effect.
A simple effects analysis of the adjusted cells means 
employing 6 F tests was computed. These results indicate 
that low strength of commitment experimental S s engaging 
in counterat.titudinai essay writing make greater post­
manipulation recall of initial attitude errors than high 
strength of commitment experimental 3 s writing similar 
essays (F = 5*58; df 1.39; P <<>05). I-ow strength of com­
mitment experimentals make greater recall error than low 
strength of commitment controls (F =• Id.33; df = 1.39; 
p <.01) and high strength of -commitment controls (F - 7.80; 
df = 1.39; P <.01). The high strength experimental group 
does not differ significantly in amount of recall error 
from either control group.
These analyses rjrovide evidence pertinent to two of 
the experimental hypotheses.
Hypothesis d .. Experimental subjects will show 
greater error in recall of initial attitude in the direction 
of the positions argued in the essays than control subjects.
Hypothesis 6. There will be a significant inter­
action effect between level of strength of commitment and 
the treatment conditions with recall error as the depend­
ent variable. Experimental high strength of commitment 
subjects will make significantly greater recall of attitude 
error than experimental low relevance subjects.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Hypothesis 4 received support at the .01 level of 
statistical significance. Hypothesis 6 was not supported 
as stated. Similar to the results of the recall experiment 
when relevance is the independent variable a significant 
(p. ^.05) interaction effect was noted for the strength 
of commitment analysis, but the nature of the interaction 
was in the direction opposite to the predictions, ihus, 
experimental low strength Ss made significantly greater 
recall of initial attitude error than high strength Ss.
Again, with regards to hypothesis 4 the predicted 
main effect is due largely to the differences between exp­
erimental low strength of commitment Ss and the control 
conditions since high strength of commitment Ss behave 
similarly to the controls in terms of recall error.
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Chapter IV 
Discussion
The major objective of the study involved a partial 
replication of Bern and McConnell's (1970) procedure des­
igned to assess, the "salience" of premanipulation, attitude 
to attitude ratings after the experimental manipulation of 
writing counterattitudinal essays. Thus the major question 
to be asked is: "does initial attitude effect outcome 
attitude after manipulation,in any way?" The answer to 
this question has great relevance to the viability of 
Bern's self-perception theory of attitude phenomena and 
the concomitant means of testing his theory by means of 
the "interpersonal simulation" technique. These issues 
have been discussed adequately in Chapter I.
Briefly to recount the results' of Bern and McConnell's 
(1970) work, they found that 8 s in a typical forced 
compliance experiment are not able to recall their pre­
manipulation attitudes correctly. Moreover, they actually 
perceive their postmanipulation attitudes to be Identical 
to their premanipulation attitudes. Beni 1 McConnell infer 
from these results confirmation of the self-perception 
hypothesis that the participant's observation of himself
-  77 _
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engaging voluntarily in counterattitudinal behaviour has 
so strong an effect on him as to virtually "wipe out" the 
effects of any relevant premanipulation attitude elements. 
Thus the participant makes the sane inferences as an indep­
endent observer regarding what his attitude must be after 
the manipulation. Their conclusion was that premanipul­
ation attitude is "non-salient" for the participant S s 
and thus irrelevant information for the observer-. S s of 
an interpersonal simulation of a forced compliance experi­
ment.
The present study suggests that if 3 s are partitioned 
into levels of "attitude relevance" and/or attitude "strength 
of commitment" interaction effects between these two indep­
endent variables and attitude recall error and attitude 
change (as dependent variables) will occur. The results 
of the study support this general prediction although the 
specific predictions as to the nature of this interaction 
were only supported in the Change Experiment, An inter­
action effect exactly reverse to the experimental pred­
iction was observed in the Recall Experiment. However, 
before discussing these issues some mention should be made 
of the results of the freedom of choice manipulation.
As noted, Sera's (1970) "choice condition” (which was 
exactly replicated within the present experimental treat­
ments) produced only 2 (of 32) nonconpliant _S s. The 
present studies experimental treatment resulted in 22 (of 
66) noncompliant 3 s .  Clearly differences exist between
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the 3 populations of the respective studies. These diff­
erences may be discussed in terms of the: • relative cog­
nitive predispositions of the 3 s to the experiment. In 
the first place, Bern's university student subjects were 
given course credit for participation in his experiment. 
Subjects of this experimenter were given no such post­
manipulation reward. Such incentives may have induced 
more complete compliance to the apparent wishes of the 
experimenter as presented in the "addendum sheet" for Bern' 
S s. Perhaps a more complete explanation of the radically 
different compliance results may be phrased in terms of 
certain social-personality aspects of the respective pop­
ulations. Bern's S's as male undergraduate engineering 
students are undoubtedly rather homogeneous group in terms 
of such factors as intelligence, motivation, and social 
conformity. Moreover, the "political” awareness In terms 
of campus issues (of which the student-control issue is 
one) of students in the applied sciences is perhaps lower 
than general arts students. This is not to say that these 
students are not aware and involved with certain signif­
icant issues. For instance, government contract allotment 
cut backs as an Issue, would probably induce a good deal 
of involvement for engineering students. Hov/ever, one 
might -postulate (admittedly on tenuous empirical grounds) 
that Bern's choice of 3 pool and his choice of issue was 
ideal to gain compliance and produce the "non-salience" 
of initial attitude results. On the other hand, a group
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of liigh school students may be said to be more heterogeneous 
in terms of the various factors mentioned above. The range 
of scored responses on the freedom of choice scale of the 
S s in this study (1 to 60 as compared to Bern's S's 20-30) 
can be said to bear out this contention. Moreover, and per­
haps of great consequence to this discussion, the high 
school from which these 3 s were drawn had only recently 
begun a transition from school administrative control of 
courses to student choice and control of their courses. The 
experimenter only learned this after the study had been con­
ducted. Thus, the issue of focus in the forced compliance 
paradigm was relevant, in a real sense, for the 3 s in the 
present study. As a consequence, it might be assumed that 
some S s on all levels of the independent variables (non­
significant differences in this connection) chose to argue 
the position they favoured lest they be lured by a perceived 
"teacher-type" into arguing against their interests.
Considering the high degree of noncompliance and the 
high mean "freedom of choice" scores for the present study, 
it may be concluded that the choice manipulation for exper­
imental treatment S s was successful. S s in the present 
study demonstrated much greater non-compliance and greater 
mean "freedom of choice" scores than Ben and McConnell's 
population. 'Apparently, inherent differences between Bern 
and McConnell's S s and the S s of this study, caused dif­
ferences in willingness to comply with regard to the type 
of essay to write, with the present 3 population being less 
willing to comply.
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With regard to the three dimensions of attitude; 
relevance, strength of commitment and position, as measured 
by the 61-point horizontal scales, they do not represent 
distinct factors of the attitude element as the inter­
correlation matrix presented in table 1 seems to suggest. 
They may in fact, in their combined effects represent a 
more generalized, factor of attitude that might be termed 
its "functional importance" for the subject. "Importance" 
here would be defined in terms of Festinger's meaning of 
the term when he uses it in connection with his cognitive 
dissonance theory. However, the relatively high degree 
of interrelationship between the dimensions must not obscure 
the more important fact that both relevance and strength 
of commitment as measured, were sensitive enough to sign­
ificantly differentiate S's in the crucial covariance 
analyses of the recall experiment.
Further to this issue of relation between the dimen­
sions, it might be suggested that a positional response 
bias was operant to some extent since the scales were 
identical in their structure and the nature of their pol­
arity. Again, this does not obscure the results of the 
major analysis of the experiment since such a response 
bias would have been operant for all 3 s in the same way. 
However, future research efforts may choose to vary the 
means of defining the dimensions. For example, the strength 
of commitment could be defined empirically as to extent of 
actual political activism, with respect to an Issue.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Now, with regard to the central problem and predict­
ions of the present study. All of the experimental hypo­
theses were direct generalizations fro.a implications of 
cognitive dissonance theory, I'hat is, in the change exp- 
eriment it was predicted that Ss engaging in counterattit- 
udinal behaviour (writing essays) would demonstrate attit- 
udinal shift of their positions when compared with control 
subjects who ‘did not write relevant counterattitude essays, 
(hypothesis l). Hypotheses 2 and 3 follow directly from 
theory and evidence that greater attitudinal shift will 
occur when the attitudinal element is of greater "importance' 
to the individual, i'he variables relevance of attitude 
(how often the S thinks about or is involved with the 
attitude issue as reported by him) and strength of com­
mitment (the extent to which the individual would support 
his position as reported bg him) were seen as indicants 
of the importance factor. Thus, high relevance (strength 
of commitment) Ss should show greater attitude change 
than low relevance (strength of commitment) Ss. Hypotheses 
1 and 4 received support indicating that the expected 
results of the forced compliance paradigm were produced, 
in the study. Hypotheses 2 and 3 did not receive support 
although the differences were definitely in the predicted 
direction, koreover, a simple analysis of variance 
(thus including variance due to the covariant, initial 
position) computed on the data with strength of commitment 
as the independent variable produced a signif-
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icant main effect. This was a main effect due to comparison 
of the levels of strength'of commitment. All high strength 
8 s were significantly different from all low strength 3 s.
Simple effects analysis indicate this significant main 
effect was due to a significant difference in amount of 
attitude change between the two experimental conditions.
Thus, high strength of commitment experimental S s made 
significantly greater attitude change than low strength of 
commitment experimental S s when variance due to initial 
attitude position is included in the statistical comp­
arisons of unadjusted means. (An analysis of variance on 
the data for the change experiment with attitude relevance 
as the independent variable did not produce simple effects 
results similar to those described above).
The results of the simple 2 x 2  analysis of variance 
was included since its implications da tend to counter- 
indicate an implication of self-perception theory. According 
to Bern's position (1955, 1970), "private" cognitive differen­
ces (such as subjective differences in attitude relevance, 
strength of commitment and initial position) between S s 
before they engage in behaviour which is counter to their att­
itude, should not differentiate S s, in terms of the amount 
of change that takes place after countersttitudinal behaviour. 
In Beia' s terms such private or internal differences are 
"non-salient" to the behaviour. Attitudinal change on an 
issue should be due solely to external behavioural var­
iables. In this case, since all experimental 3 s engaged
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in the sane behaviour (the essay quality analysis by 
independent judges, as reported in the methods section 
would indicate they did) the results should not be infl­
uenced by premanipulation characteristics of the attitude 
if Ben's assumptions are correct.
However, experimental hypotheses 2 and 3 cue phrased 
in terms of the importance variables as operationally 
defined in the study. As such, they are not supported.
Thus, attitude relevance and strength of commitment do not 
differentiate 3s in terms of attitude change, after counter- 
attitudinal behaviour, at statistically significant levels 
'although the differences are in the predicted direction.
'the data from the recall experiment offers some very 
interesting implications for discussion. Again, there 
were significant differences between nondifferentiated 
experimental treatment Os and controls on the dependent 
variable (here, recall of initial attitude error). 
Hypothesis 4 predicted this difference and both self- 
'perception and cognitive dissonance theory anticipate this 
result although the respective theories would explain it 
in different v;ays as has been discussed previously. Cog­
nitive dissonance theory explains that engaging in counter- 
attitudinal behaviour (i.e. vrx’iting count or at t itudinal 
essays) induces a psychologically unconfortable state 
within the individual termed dissonance, fne presence of 
dissonance encourages dissonance reducing behaviour. In
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one's recall of a previously expressed position on the 
issue in the direction of the position taken in the essay. 
On the other hand, self-perception theory explains that 
the individual produces the dissonance phenomena by 
observing his counterattitudinal behaviour and the cont­
rolling circumstances of that behaviour, much as an indep­
endent observer wfould. The behaviourally involved S then 
makes decisions about the status of his attitude based 
solely on the relevant behaviour and its controlling cir­
cumstances. Thus, an error in recall would be interpreted 
through the self-perception hypothesis as error based 
solely on the effects of self-perceived behavioural obser­
vations without any recourse to internal cognitive circum­
stances of the S. The crucial question of this study is 
which theory explains the data most adequately.
Hypotheses 4- and 5 phrased in terms of cognitive dis­
sonance theory reflect this question and the data relevant 
to these respective predictions provide critical evidence 
regarding the question.
Hypotheses 4- and 5 as stated are not supported. How­
ever, a statistically significant interaction between 
levels of the importance variables, attitude relevance and 
strength of commitment, and the treatment conditions 
(experimental versus control) is evident. The prediction 
that experimental treatment 3 s with high scores on imp­
ortance variables would make significantly greater amount 
of recall error than the low level S s, was derived from
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Bestinger1s (1957) original theoretical premises. She 
present data indicates an interaction effect directly 
opposite to the derived prediction. Thus, experimental 
S s with low scores on the importance variables make sign­
ificantly greater recall error than high importance level 
S s and controls. This result does not support the derivatio 
of cognitive dissonance theory presented in hypotheses 5 and 
6, nor does it support self-perception theory which would 
predict no differences in recall error between the high 
and low importonce groups.
Bern and McConnell (1970) employed the recall of 
initial attitude measure as an indicant of the "salience" 
of prenanipulation attitude.. In their terms, if preman­
ipulation attitude was salient 3 s would be able to rem­
ember their previously expressed position on the relevant 
issue after they had engaged In counterattitudinal behav­
iour. Their 8 s who wrote counterattitudinal essays in 
the "choice condition" (here the experimental treatment) 
could not correctly recall their initial position when 
compared to control S s, who did not write essays. They 
interpret this data as an indication that premanipulat ion 
attitude is effectively "wiped out" as an influence in 
postrnanipulation measurements of new position on the issue.
It is "wiped out" by the very salient effects of writing 
counterattitudinal essays.
Bern a McConnell also suggest that recalling one's 
previously expressed position after manipulation is
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"phenomenologically identical'1 to expressing a new pos­
ition. Both measures are effected in the sane way by 
observing counterattitudinal behaviour.
The present data seems to call into question their 
assumptions. The low importance experimental groups 
(low relevance and low strength of commitment) seem to 
behave as Bern and McConnell's (1970) choice treatment cond­
ition S s did. That is, they forgot their initial attit­
ude after counterattitudinal behaviour and made recall 
distortions in the direction of positions argued in the 
essays. However, the high importance experimental groups 
in the present recall experiment did not forget ’their orig­
inal positions when compared to low importance groups and 
controls.
The implication is that when an attitude is important 
to a person he will not forget what his position was on 
the issue even after engaging in counterattitudinal beh­
aviour. In other words, premanipulation attitude is 
"salient''' when high Importance 3 s are engaging in counter­
attitudinal behaviour in that they are apparently aware of it, 
Moreover, for high importance 3 s the recall measure and 
the new position (change) measure are not "phenomenologically 
identical" in that they are apparently effected by counter­
attitudinal manipulation in different ways as evidenced by 
the data for high importance experimental S s in the change 
experiment in which high importance 3 s did tend to prod­
uce greater change than low importance experimental 3 s.
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88.
A comparison drawn between the data of the two comp­
onent experiments helps to explain the salience of prenianip- 
ulation attitude issue in the context of the usual forced- 
compliance experiment where change of attitude (rather than 
recall of initial position) is the outcome variable.
Apparently S s for whom the issue is an important one 
(it is quite relevant for them and they express strong 
commitment to it) are aware of their premanipulation pos­
ition throughout the forced compliance experiment. In 
other words, their attitude is salient to the experiment 
throughout, moreover, because it is salient to them this 
salience may be said to induce greater dissonance and con­
comitantly greater (but nonsignificantly greater in this 
experiment)amounts of attitude change when they are compared 
to controls and low importance experimental in a "forced 
compliance" (change) experiment. On the other hand, low 
importance S 's are not particularly concerned about their 
original position. It is less salient for them and engaging 
in counterattitudinal behaviour is a strong enough influence 
to cause them to forget their original position and produce 
attitude change effects. Because original attitude is less 
salient for them, dissonance is less severe and attitude 
changes less than the high importance experimentals for 
whom original attitude is quite salient.
If these contentions are viable, Bern's self-perception
hypothesis and his interpersonal-simulation technique for 
testing his theory are challenged to some extent by the
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results of the present experiments. Self--perception theory 
is capable of explaining the data of the low importance 
groups in both component experiments. However, Bern's premise 
that internal cognitive components are not salient to the 
forced-corapliance paradigm for all 3 s is not supported by 
the results of these experiments. Apparently, for certain 
individuals for v/horn a given issue is highly relevant and 
to which they' are strongly committed internal variables 
(such as prenanipulation attitude position) do play a 
certain role in determining self-perceived attitude judge­
ments.
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SUMMARY
The purpose of this study was to provide further evidence 
relevant to a controversy that has arisen over a major postulate 
of Bern's self-perception theory and the "interpersonal 
simulations" used by Bern to test his theory. Briefly, Bern's 
theory, designed as an alternative explanation of cognitive 
dissonance phenomena, states that people make judgements about 
their own behaviour in the same manner as they make judgements 
about another’s behaviour. In a "forced-compliance" paradigm 
experiment where Ss are made to engage in counterattitudinal 
behaviour, Bern's theory explains the usual dissonance effects 
(as indicated by postmanipulation attitude change) as due to 
the Ss observation of his behaviour and its controlling 
conditions within the experiment. The theory holds that these 
behavioural observations and subsequent judgements made on the 
basis of them, are phenomenologically the same processes that 
occur if an independent person were to observe the Ss behaviour 
and make subsequent judgements as to its implications. The 
"interpersonal simulation" technique was designed by Bern to 
test his theory. In an "interpersonal simulation", independent 
"observer subjects" are provided with a description of a
cognitive dissonance experiment (e.g. forced-compliance
\
paradigm) and are requested to make an estimate of the.original 
"participating-subjects" attitude ratings, on scales provided
90
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at the end of the description.
A controversy has developed concerning the information 
that should he provided to the "observer-subjects" in an 
’’interpersonal simulation”. Bern's critics have stated that 
if the original experiment is to be truly simulated or 
replicated in an interpersonal context, "observer-subjects" 
must be provided with the "participating-subjects" premanipulation 
attitude, Bern, through his theory, maintains that premanipulation 
attitude of the "particupating-subject" is "non-salient" to 
postmanipulation phenomenlogy and thus irrelevant information 
as far as an "observer-subject" is concerned.
The present study employs a partial replication of Bern 
and McConnell's (1970) experiments and tests the "salience" 
of premanipulation attitude by asking Ss to recall their initial 
attitude position (expressed one week previously) after they 
have engaged in counterattitudinal behaviour of a "forced- 
compliance" experiment. Following Bern and McConnell (1970), 
recall of initial attitude error was taken as an indication 
of the degree of salience of premanipulation attitude to the 
experiment.
The major thesis of the study was that recall error would 
vary as the degree of "importance" of the manipulated attitude 
varied for the S. "Importance" was operationally defined in 
two wayss the relevance of the attitude for the S and the S's 
strength of commitment to the attitude. The results demonstrate 
that Ss for whom the attitude-issue was highly important made 
significantly less recall error than low importance subjects
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or controls. This suggests that when a premanipulation 
attitude is important to a S, this attitude then remains a 
salient factor in a forced-compliance experiment. Furthermore, 
high importance Ss engaging in a separate forced-compliance 
experiment with the typical attitude change measure as the 
outcome variable show greater (though nonsignificant) attitude 
change than low importance Ss and controls. The difference 
were nonsignificant when the major analytical design was 
applied to the data; a 2 2 analysis of covariance. However, 
a simple analysis of variance (thus including variance due to 
the covariant initial attitude position) computed on the data 
with strength of commitment as the independent variable 
produced a significant main effect. This was a main effect 
due to comparison of the levels of strength of commitment. 
Simple effects analysis indicate this main effect was due to 
a significant difference in amount of attitude change between 
the two experimental treatment conditions. Thus, high strength 
of commitment experimental Ss made significantly greater 
attitude change than low strength of commitment experimentals, 
when variance due to difference in intial attitude position 
was included in the statistical comparison of unadjusted means.
From this one might infer that the high salience level of 
initial attitude for the high importance group, tends to 
increase dissonance and encourage stronger dissonance reducing 
behaviour.
These results are non-supportive of Bern's position and 
suggest that premanipulation attitude is a salient feature of
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a forced-compliance experiment's phenomenology for some 
individuals - namely, those for whom the particular attitude 
is important. Within the cognitive dissonance framework the 
results suggest that those Ss for whom the attitude is important 
do not reduce the dissonance by shifting their attitude and 
then simply forgetting their premanipulation attitude.
Apparently they both shift their attitude after the experimental 
manipulation and yet can still recall their premanipulation 
attitude.
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APPENDIX A-l
Scales of First Session Designed to
Assess Initial Attitude Position and the Levels of
the Independent Variables
Issue #1
How much control should students have over 
the kinds of courses offered at their school?
ATTITUDE POSITION SCALE 
(What is your position on the above issue?)
1 1 1 .1.   1 1 1
No Very Little Some Much Very Complete
Control Little Control Control Control Much Control
Control • Control
STRENGTH OF ATTITUDE COMMITMENT SCALE
(How strong do you feel your commitment to your position on 
this issue is?)
1 1 1 1 1  1 1
No Very Weak Moderate Strong Very Complete
Comit- Weak Comit- Comit- Comit- Strong Comit-
ment Comit- ment ment merit Comit- ment
At All ment ment
ATTITUDE RELEVANCE SCALE
(How often do you give consideration or think about this issue 
in your day to day life?)
1 .......... _________1 ___________ , , , , 1
Never Very Seldom Sometimes Often Very Almost
Think Seldom Think Think Think Often Always
About Think About About About Think Think
It About It It It About About
It It It
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APPENDIX A-2
Change Experiment - Scale to Assess Attitude Change
Please mark the following scales according to what best 
represents your present feelings toward the issue of i How 
much control should students have over the kinds of courses 
offered at their school?
ATTITUDE POSITION SCALE 
(What is your position on the above issue?)
1 1 .1. . . . . . .  .1. . . . . . .  .1    .1 .1
No Very Little Some Much Very Complete
Control Little Control Control Control Much Control
Control Control
95
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APPENDIX A-3
Recall Experiment - Scale to Assess Attitude Recall
In the first session, one week ago we asked your co­
operation in a survey of student attitudes. One of the issues 
in the questionnaire concerned,; How much control students 
should have over the kinds of courses offered at their school?
Now we, want you to try and recall your feelings expressed 
on the three scales toward the student control issue in the 
first session, by marking the following scales in the same 
places you did one week ago. .
ATTITUDE POSITION SCALE
(What was your position expressed one week ago 011 the above 
issue?)
1 1 1 ...1 ...1... 1 1
No Very Little Some Much Very Complete
Control Little Control Control Control Much Control
Control Control
96
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APPENDIX A-4
"Freedom of Choice" Scale for all Experimental Subjects
You have just written an essay taking a strong position 
on the student control of courses issue.
Please indicate on the following scale how much freedom 
of choice you feel that you had in choosing which side of the 
issue to argue for in your essay.
No Very Little Some Much Very Complete
Freedom Little Freedom Freedom Freedom Much Freedom
Of Freedom Of Of Of. Freedom Of
Choice Of Choice Choice Choice Of Choice
Choice Choice
9?
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Appendix B-l 
Reproduction of Tabulated data of 
Bern and McConnell (1970)
Table 1
Attitude Change produced by Forced-Compliance 
as a Function of Freedom of Choice 
' to Comply
Treatment Perception Initial Attitude
of Choice Attitude Change
Choice (N=16) (A) 26.3 37.0 -9.3
No Choice (N=16) (B) 3.4 36.1 -2.8
Control (N=16) (C) -- 38.6 +0.1
t t t
A versus B 3.70 1.00 1.98*
A versus C -- 1.00 2.89**
B versus C 1.00 1.38
*p <.06 
**p <.01 
***p< .001
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Bern & McConnell Data (cont’d)
Table 2
Attitude Recall Error produced by Forced-Compliance 
as a Function of Freedom of Choice 
to Comply
Treatment Perception 
of Choice
Initial
Attitude
Attitude 
Recall Error
Choice (N=15) (A) 33.0 39.1 -9.7
No Choice (N=15) (B) 2.1 38.0 -3.2
Control (N=15) (C) 39.0 -1.0
t t t
A versus B 5.84*** 1.00 1.73*
A versus C 1.00 2.54**
B versus C -- 1.00 0.99
*p <.10 
**p <.02 
***p< .001
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Bern & McConnel Data (cont’d)
Table 3
Produet-moment Correlations between 
Recall of Initial Attitudes and 
Initial and Final Attitudes
Treatment Recall versus 
Initial Attitudes
Recall versus 
Final Attitudes
t
(Difference
Choice (N=15) + .26 + .98 10.05*
No Choice (N=15) + .71 + .96 4.32*
Control (N=15) + .75 + .57 -1.33
*p <.001
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APPENDIX B-2
Excerpt from Hays (1966), Statistics 
for Psychologists re t Intercorrelation
Comparisons, (pp. 576-577)
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE FOR INTERCORRELATIONS
Before we leave the topic of correlation, a word must be 
said about significance tests for intercorrelations. It is 
quite common to find research in psychology where a number of 
different variables are studied in the same sample, and all 
sample intercorrelations are found among these variables. For 
example, a study may concern three variables, Xi, X2, and X3, 
and values are found for ri2» rjj, and rzj. This in itself is 
fine as a description of linear relations in the data, and is 
the first step in virtually any multivariate analysis, such 
as finding a multiple-regression equation or carrying out a 
factor analysis.
However, one often finds the experimenter testing the
Ksignificance of each one of these (^ ) intercorrelations by the
method of Section 15.26, as though each one were based on a 
different sample. The resulting significance levels are largely 
meaningless, for reasons much like those making t tests for 
all differences among a set of means a dubious procedure. In 
the first place, even for independent tests of significance, 
when so many tests are carried out the probability that some 
Type I errors are being made may be very high. Even worse, 
the t tests for correlations are quite redundant and are not 
statistically independent when carried out on a table of 
intercorrelations. Consequently, the set of results can be 
grossly misleading. In particular, one should ordinarily
expect more than (g) a such tests to show significance by
chance alone.
It is simple to illustrate that restrictions exist in a 
table of intercorrelations. Consider a sample of N cases, each 
of which gives three scores, Xi, X2, and X3, Imagine that ri2 
turns out to be - ,80 and r^o is also - ,80, What is the 
smallest value that r23 can be? In this instance, it is not
101
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 2
possible for r23 to be - 1,00, or - .8, or - . 5i or indeed, 
any negative value at all. The very smallest value that r23 
can show for these data is .10, Fixing the value of two of 
the correlations determines the necessary lower limit for the 
third. The values of intercorrelations are dependent upon 
each other in a given sample.
KIn general, for K variables, the average of the Q )
intercorrelations among these variables must be greater than 
(or equal to) ~l/(K - 1), It follows that given the values of 
some of the intercorrelations, the average lower limit for all 
the other correlations is not - 1, but some number greater than 
- 1, The larger K is, the closer this lower limit comes to 0. 
Hence, it is somewhat pointless to treat each of the correlations 
in turn as though the sampling distribution of values could 
extend from - 1 through + 1, when with each successive value 
of r known from the sample the possible lower limit to the next 
set of values is raised. One should either not test for 
significance in the ordinary way in dealing with intercorrelations 
found for a single sample, or he should 3.nterpriT~th¥~signirficanc'e 
levels with considerable latitude.
It is rather-hard to see why anyone would want to know if 
all the true intercorrelations among a set of variables are 
zero anyway. If these variables are to be used to predict some 
other variable, then a test of significance for is much more 
meaningful. If some other regression method is contemplated, 
appropriate tests may also exist for the results of applying 
this method, Traeing relationships among variables is the 
legitimate business of the scientist, but simply asking if 
anything relates linearly to anything else in a large set of 
variables is a pretty crude way to do business.
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APPENDIX C - RAW DATA BY EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION 
Change Experiment - Subjects Devided on Attitude Relevance
Experimental Conditions
Low Relevance 
Freedom
High Relevance
Freedom Strength
l'o  j e c t Relevance Change of Choice Commitment Subject Relevance Change of Choice Commitment
1. 23 +5 50 33 11. 41 -2 3 52
2. 12 -18 46 35 12. 42 -20 12 42
3. 12 -3 59 32 13. 52 -32 59 43
4, 11 -7 1 36 14. 35 -21 41 41
5. 20 -9 60 .'20 15. 35 -31 59 44
6, 12 +17 60 23 16, 54 -30 38 42
7. 23 -13 41 31 17. 43 -33 60 54
8. 3 -10 41 41 18.. 36 30 42
9. 21 -23 15 20 J- S  9 38 +8 22 33
10, 11 -10 33 11 20. 35 0 58 48
Control Condition
*
J» 9 21 +21 38 36.
22. 11 +25 1 37.
23. 21 -6 41 38.
24. 21 +13 41 39.
25. 3 -16 31 40.
26. 25 +2 59 41.
2?. 24 0 34 42.
28. 20 -10 20 43.
29. 5 -6 11 44.
30. 13 +3 25 45.
31. . 10 0 10 46.
32. 11 0 31 47.
33. 11 -1 23 48.
34. 4 -3 22 49.
35. 13 0 34 50.
41
35
36 
35
40
45
50 
4-1
51
41
35
42 
51. 
45 
50
+19
+12
-7
+4
+7
+24
-16
-fl
+7
-2
-1
-7
-7
+1
0
33
38
33
36
31
35
52
52
53 
4o
35
42
59
45
40 o
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Recall Experiment - Subjects Devided on Attitude Relevance
Experimental Condition 
Low Relevance High Relevance
Recall Freedom Strength of 
Subject Relevance Error of Choice Commitment
1. 21 0 59 kl
2, 16 -6 36 kl
- 8 -id 38 27
4. 20 -2 25 31
5. 11 -1 50 31
6, 23 -20 24 23
7. 21 +1 60 k8
8, 13 -20 52 kk
9. 25 -10 51 21
10. 23 -1 31 k6
11. 25 -22 57 29
12, 22 -9 k9 22
C(
25. 10 25
26. 19 +lj. 35
27, 18 +2 36
28. 5 -10 k2
29. 24 -7 39
30. 2k -k k2
31. 22 +7 k2
32. 11 -1 k?
33. 12 +1 36
34. 11 +6 k9
35. ■ 11 +4 21
36. 10 +7 11
37. 11 +4 41
38. 23 -1 43
39. 11 -1 22
Recall Freedom Strength of 
Subject Relevance Error of Choice Commitment
13. 43 -20 43 45
14. 36 -4' 32 29
15. 45 -5 52 45
16, 36 +9 38 45
17. 36 0 25 43
18. k5 +6 47 49
19. k2 +5 43 43
20. 50 +7 2 40
21. ko -8 60 30
22. 48 +7 1 25
23. ko -2 60 45
2k, 36 -4 53 25
lition
ko. 35 0 44
kl. 37 -2 43
k2. 38 +7 28
^3- 36 +4 33
kk. 38 +7 30
45. 40 +4 46
k6. 42 0 42
k7. 4? -9 54
48. 51 +6 42
k9. 38 -2 4l
50. 43 -1 52
51. 35 -2 41
52. 35 -14 37
53. 38 -14 46
5k, 51 -13 30 ff
Ol
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APPKTDIX B-l
Further Analysis and Discussion of the Correlation 
Between Initial Position and Attitude Change
The possibility that the significant correlation 
(-.38 p.<.01) between initial attitude position and 
attitude change resulted from a "ceiling effect" was 
considered. Thus, it is possible that 2s who scored at 
the high end of the initial position scale were prevented 
from changing in an even more extreme positive direction 
because of a lack of room on the scale in the positive 
direction (towards 60). Of the entire change experiment 
S sample (50) 16 Os ranked their initial position above 
45. Of these 16, 12 Ss changed their final attitude 
position by moving down on the scale, rather than re­
maining at the same position or moving up (towards 60). 
Only two Ss (1 experimental, 1 control) had scored so 
high (60 and 59 respectively) that they could not eff­
ectively change in a positive direction. Both of these 
Ss changed by moving down on the scale (towards 0) —  
or in other words, in a dissonance reducing direction.
If these data are broken down into experimental Ss 
versus control Ss it is found that 7 (of 20) experimental 
treatment Ss ranked their initial attitude position 
above 45 on the scale. Only 1 ox the seven changed in a 
positive direction (45 to 50) and 1 remained the same.
All others changed in the negative direction after 
counterattitudinal nan initiation. In the control 6 samolc
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9 Ss ranked themselves initially above 4-5 on the attitude 
position scale. Of these 9 Ss, 2 changed in a positive 
direction and 1 S remained the same, ihus, 6 control Ss 
above the 45 position changed in a downward direction.
Since only 2 Ss were actually in a situation where 
they could not score higher on the scale in the final 
attitude position assessment and neither of these Ss 
remained the same but instead showed a dissonance effect, 
a "ceiling effect" bias is not a viable explanation of 
the significant correlation between initial attitude 
position and attitude change. Moreover, there were sign­
ificant differences in attitude change when experinentals 
were compared to controls (the dissonance effect). Ihus, 
no general tendency for high scoring Ss to change in a 
negative direction appears to have brought about the
dissonance phenomena.
In summary, it seems that virtually all Ss were 
effectively able to change in either direction or remain 
the same at the second assessment of attitude position 
and in fact they all v?ith 14 exceptions changed in a dis­
sonance reducing direction, fhe ramifications of the 
correlation between attitude position and attitude change 
are r o d  — la a t is, the negative correlation tends to 
counter Bern's assumption regarding the non-salience of 
preraonipulation attitudes.
One other issue v/ith regard to this significant 
correlation remains to be considered. It seems that 5s
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with extreme positions (above 45) on the initial position 
scale tended to change in a negative direction on the 
final position assessment in both the experimental and 
control conditions. This shift then, could have been an 
artifact of a "regression towards the mean" phenomenon 
for extreme initial position 3s. i'o establish if the 
greater change for the experimental 3s with extreme 
initial positions was really due to dissonance•effects 
and not a result of regression to the mean effect a t 
test was computed comparing the 5 experimental Ss with 
extreme initial positions who changed in a negative dir­
ection, to the 6 controls with extreme initial positions 
who changed in a negative direction, the result indic­
ates a statistically significant difference (t=2.32 £ < . 05) 
in the mean change scores for the two extreme initial 
position groups. I'his result effectively eliminates a 
regression to the mean phenomena as a factor in producing 
the dissonance results evident when comparing extreme 
initial position Ss of the two treatment conditions.
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Change Experiment: Summary of .-analysis of Variance with
Attitude Relevance the Independent Variables
Source df ihS V p
A (Treatments) 1 2251.2873 15.8725 .001
B (Relevance) 1 218.5819 1.5411 U.S.
AB (Interaction) 1 315.918? 2.2274 i-> • -LJ *
Error 46' 141.8361
o
A simple 2 x 2  analysis of variance design which includes 
variance due to the covariant initial position was comp­
uted. This computation did not change the nature of the 
results as analyzed with a 2 x 2 analysis of covariance.
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